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GLOBALIZING PROPERTY 
PRIYA S. GUPTA* 
ABSTRACT 
Property is more than domestic.  It is international, 
transnational, and global.  Its reach, its consequences, and its ideas 
can rarely be theorized effectively or contained entirely within 
national borders.  It is produced through encounters between actors 
from multiple jurisdictions, and by law from multiple sources.  It is 
not stable or static.  It is contested and ever evolving.  Common law 
property is not neutral or ahistoric.  It was formed in particular 
moments, and it benefits particular constellations of power. 
Beginning with a history of several significant moments of 
property-related conflicts between foreign property claimants and 
domestic property holders, the Article puts forward the argument 
that these conflictual encounters constitute the basis for the 
formation of common law property thought as understood today.  
The development of property thought is then traced not as a linear 
trajectory without regard to the concrete historical and geographical 
circumstances, but rather as operating in the midst of different 
phases of socio-economic transformation.  In examining that 
genealogy, and in placing property doctrine in a globalized 
sociological and political economic context, this Article attempts to 
reveal how the current moment of financial capitalism has 
mobilized a significant ceding of sovereignty and accountability to 
private actors through—often taken-for-granted—common law 
property regimes. 
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Given property law’s ambivalent position between a 
constitutional right and a core token in private regulatory 
governance, a study of ‘transnational property’ invites two related 
reflections.  First, that property, when studied from a transnational 
perspective, is a norm which is constantly operationalized, fought 
over, and stipulated against a background of shifting sovereignty 
claims between public actors and private agents.  Second, property 
law, in its historical and geographical formation, has always been 
both transnational and ‘hybrid.’  It must be appreciated against the 
background of historical contingency, involving past and present 
assertions of might and superiority and resulting in disturbing 
patterns of legal export, transplant, and intervention.  A fresh look 
at the transnational origins and dimensions of property law today 
furthermore promises to shed new light on the effect that property 
law has had on differently situated stakeholders and reveals how 
transnational property legal regimes continue to be sites of conflict 
and struggle. 
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“Rational concern for the production and sharing of wealth and other 
values either in the United States or in other countries cannot today 
stop short with the political boundaries of the contemporary nation-
state.”1 
Myres McDougal 
David Haber 
 
“How far can law still be thought of in terms of distinct systems when 
new or newly important forms of powerful, authoritative regulation are 
created outside—or at least are not limited within—the jurisdictions of 
nation-states . . . ? How far is it becoming realistic to think of law in 
terms of diverse, intersecting, interacting networks of regulation rather 
than self-contained systems?”2 
Roger Cotterrell 
  
 
 1  See MYRES MCDOUGAL & DAVID HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: 
ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT: SELECTED CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS 
ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION 1156 (1948) [hereinafter 
MCDOUGAL & HABER]. 
 2 See ROGER COTTERRELL, SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE: JURISTIC THOUGHT AND 
SOCIAL INQUIRY (2017). 
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1. PROPERTY LAW, TRANSNATIONAL: LAW OUT OF CONFLICT 
The first quote above from American legal scholars Myres 
McDougal and David Haber is from their property law textbook, 
published in 1948 when they were professors at Yale Law School.3  
The second quote, from English legal scholar Roger Cotterrell, is 
from a monograph published just shy of seventy years later.  That 
resources and the law that governs them are globalized and not 
“self-contained” evidently still needs to be argued explicitly. 
This Article traces the idea of property law—the law that 
governs resources—as a product of globalized legal thought, 
practice, and encounters.  While the approach to a distinctly 
globalized framing of property appears to be of recent emergence, 
this Article starts from the premise that current common law 
conceptions of property and doctrinal frameworks are by definition 
transnational, which, as a first matter, implies that they were largely 
formed as a result of encounters4  between domestic and foreign 
actors.  In that regard, the proposition made here is that laws and 
norms that inform current debates over cross-border claims to 
property—including foreign acquisition of agricultural land (land 
grabs),5 the control of natural resources,6 or investor-state dispute 
 
 3 MCDOUGAL & HABER, supra note 1. 
 4 On the idea of “encounter” as international law-producing, see Sundhya 
Pahuja, Laws Of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account Of International Law, 1 LONDON 
REV. INT’L L. 63 (2013) (describing international law as a law of encounter and 
showing how the actualization of the state is an ongoing project of international 
law.). 
 5 See, e.g., Smita Narula, The Global Land Rush: Markets, Rights, and the Politics 
of Food, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 101 (2013); LORENZO COTULA, THE GREAT AFRICAN LAND 
GRAB?: AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENTS AND THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM (2013). 
 6  For literature surrounding the often-referenced compendium of mining 
companies and the control of natural resources, see ROGER MOODY, THE GULLIVER 
FILE: MINES, PEOPLE, AND LAND: A GLOBAL BATTLEGROUND (1992); Anthony 
Bebbington, The New Extraction: Rewriting the Political Ecology of the Andes?, in 49 
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 12-20 (2009); Al Gedick, Resource Wars against 
Native People in Colombia, 54 CAPITALISM, NATURE, SOCIALISM 85 (2003); Todd Gordon 
& Jeffery R. Webber, Imperialism and Resistance: Canadian Mining Companies in Latin 
America, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 63 (2008); Sundhya Pahuja, Conserving the World’s 
Resources?, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 388-420 (James 
Crawford & Martti Koskeniemmi eds., 2012). 
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settlement (ISDS) 7 —must be studied against a complex global 
historical and geopolitical background. 
In other words, a starting assertion of the following analysis is 
that property law and thought are ever-evolving and involve a global 
set of actors and ideas. 8   Admittedly, to some readers who 
intuitively engage with all law as operating in a global context, this 
argument will seem fairly obvious, albeit under-explored in current 
property law literature.  To others, however, it will likely not.  Many 
American property law casebooks treat property law as nearly 
entirely constituted through domestic legal processes and 
substantive law.9  Coverage of topics such as takings, trespass, racial 
 
 7  See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 
(2008) [hereinafter VAN HARTEN 2008]; M. SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2015). 
 8  See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY (2014) 
(describing the origins and evolution of property rights developed in the 
international).  On the challenges that globalization presents for domestic property 
regimes, see AMNON LEHAVI, PROPERTY LAW IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (2019) 
(examining various doctrinal areas in property and “strategies” to adapt to cross-
border activities).  On property rights of states under public international law, see 
Peter Tzeng, The State’s Right to Property Under International Law, 125 YALE L.J. 1805 
(2015) (describing States rights and international controversies concerning property 
rights under international law). 
 9  See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY (7th ed. 2010); THOMAS W. 
MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2d ed. 2012); JOHN 
G. SPRANKLING, & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 
(4th ed. 2018).  This is not to say that there are not any comparative references to 
doctrine or scholarship from outside the United States.  Merrill and Smith, for 
example, have a number of comparisons throughout the text.  However, the concern 
that this Article seeks to address is that it remains under-appreciated that American, 
and other systems, property doctrines and thought are constituted through their 
global context. 
 This is also not to argue that the authors themselves see property this way.  For 
example, casebook author John Sprankling has several projects on property under 
public international law, and Gregory Alexander has engaged in a number of 
comparative law projects.  See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
PROPERTY (2014); JOHN G. SPRANKLING, RAYMOND R. COLETTA, & M.C. MIROW, 
GLOBAL ISSUES IN PROPERTY LAW (2006); GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE 
OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 
(2006); Gregory S. Alexander, Comparing the Two Legal Realisms—American and 
Scandinavian, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 131 (2002). 
 Rather, the lack of engagement that this Article wishes to draw attention to in 
first-year casebooks only underscores the power of the belief that first-year law 
students should learn the “law” of property, which would not include global 
influences, events, theory, or doctrine. 
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discrimination, land use, and foreclosure, for example, include little 
reference to legal thought and practice outside of national 
boundaries or of global influences or events.10 
 
 The exception may be limited references to English common law and thought 
(and the rare mention of Roman law), but even those generally portray the 
constitution of property doctrine as a linear one-way process—with new Americans 
instituting their own variations on what they wanted to adapt from original English 
common law (for example, ridding themselves of the fee tail or in their treatment 
of equity), rather than an ongoing dialogue and constitution.  Even treatments of 
Johnson v. M’Intosh—by its nature a transnational case (as discussed in Part II), 
generally do not engage with the idea of American Empire, or even of the case as 
an account of encounter between two sovereign powers. 
 10 Alternatively, seeing property in global contexts could mean the following: 
Takings law could include discussion on the influence of foreign investors and 
foreign investment law.  See discussion infra Part II.  It should be noted here that 
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 9, at 1211-18, does include a brief discussion of 
government forbearance in the context of Foreign Investment Treaties. 
A trespass case often used in casebooks, State v. Shack, involved migrant workers 
living on the farm on which they worked and denied access to aid workers by their 
employer.  See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).  The geopolitical context in 
which they ended up working and living on the farm of an authoritarian employer 
is significant in understanding the New Jersey aid program at issue and the 
precarious situation of the workers.  See id. 
Desegregation has its own history of foreign relations and international pressure 
rarely found in first-year curricula.  Shelley v. Kraemer, the 1948 Supreme Court case 
that prohibited racially restrictive covenants in property sales had an amicus curiae 
brief on behalf of the United States which had the following quote from then-Acting 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson: 
“The existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country 
has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries.  We are 
reminded over and over by some foreign newspapers and spokesmen, that 
our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired . . . . 
Frequently we find it next to impossible to formulate a satisfactory answer 
to our critics in other countries . . . . 
An atmosphere of suspicion and resentment in a country over the way a 
minority is being treated in the United States is a formidable obstacle to 
the development of mutual understanding and trust between the two 
countries.  We will have better international relations when these reasons 
for suspicion and resentment have been removed.” 
See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STANFORD L. REV. 61, 
101 (1988) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).  Derrick Bell famously termed the Cold War pressure to 
desegregate that resulted in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education “[i]nterest-
[c]onvergence” between white people and black people.  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 
(1980). 
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The transnational context of how property law came to be is all 
but ignored.  The political pressure on the framers of the U.S. 
Constitution to conform with other common law constitutions 11 
centuries ago is invisibilized.  The Cold War pressures to end the 
most obvious forms of legal racial discrimination are not addressed.  
The increased presence and power of foreign investors exercising 
influence on property as well as property law does not appear.  This 
Article’s primary goal is to speak against the grain of that powerful 
orthodoxy of strict domestically-informed analysis. 
The orientation offered here situates property law doctrine in a 
wide context of state formation, colonialism, development, as well 
as foreign direct investment.  Similar to concurring research in 
company 12  or commercial law, 13  the central interest here is to 
identify methods of analyzing property which bring those 
sociological and political-economic contexts more directly into legal 
discourse. 
In situating property in global context, the following here 
reveals the opacity of private power in governance of and around 
property.  In doing so, it draws first from Legal Realism and its 
progeny.  However, both the nature of property ownership as well 
as the legal and regulatory webs around property have changed 
dramatically since the time of their writing in the first half of the 
twentieth century as the global economy has become increasingly 
financialized.  First, the nature of global financial flows and related 
 
Land use treatments could include pressures that local governments face to exercise 
their power to zone in favor of foreign investors and their local activities.  Finally, 
discussion of the foreclosure crisis could include accounts of how it was inherently 
global in nature because of the nature of investment in U.S. mortgage-backed 
securities, the global adoption of U.S. forms of real estate-related financial 
instruments.  
 11  See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830 5-6 
(2005) (stating that “Overseas, provincial New Yorkers successfully used those 
components of common-law constitutionalism upholding local autonomy, which 
forced the imperial agents to  search  for a separate imperial law.  But the agents’ 
attempts to create it helped precipitate rebellion, and today they are forgotten.”). 
 12 See, e.g., Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 
62 MODERN L. REV. 32 (1999). 
 13  See generally  ROY GOODE, HERBERT KRONKE, & EWAN MCKENDRICK, 
TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS (2nd ed. 2015); 
Clive M. Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the Transnational Law of Commercial 
Transactions, in 2 THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS 19-31 (Norbert Horn & Clive M. Schmitthoff eds., 1982). 
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claims of property ownership (and therefore, as will be explored, of 
governance) across jurisdictional borders stretch the market-
oriented power analyses of Realists past their limits. 
Second, the spatial disruption of jurisdictional borders more 
generally—from those that govern intellectual property, to those 
that govern online activities, to those which determine tax 
liabilities—call for a revision of place-based notions of property 
ownership. 
Third, compounding that disruption of spatial jurisdictional 
borders is the increasing blurring of legal fields as property-related 
phenomena such as, international real estate markets, rest on 
regulatory webs of finance, land use, property ownership, and 
immigration, to name a few. 
Finally, the ongoing legacy of conquest and colonial 
encounters—as manifested in, for example, indigenous claims over 
territory, uneven bargaining power in the World Trade 
Organization, or international pressure on Global South countries to 
enact or refrain from enacting certain regulatory regimes—calls for 
a retelling of how taken-for-granted doctrines in common law 
property (such as expropriation) came to be. 
Many of the property doctrines that are apparently taken for 
granted and exported or imposed through economic development 
efforts and other forms of international politics and law are treated 
as if they are neutral or scientific-like principles not in need of social 
or historical contextualization.  Indeed, one leading American 
property casebook declares, 
With a tip of the hat to Hayek, we can call the older property 
rights in land and personal property that have been around 
for so long no one remembers how they got started 
“spontaneous” or “grown” orders of property rights, and the 
newer, deliberately created schemes “made” orders of 
property rights.14 
This Article seeks to remind us, if not of the precise events, then 
at least of the constellations of power through which enduring 
notions in property “got started” and through which they are 
perpetuated.  This requires engaging with both the histories of 
 
 14  MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 9, at 1107, citing 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW 
LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35-54 (1973). 
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property doctrines (Part II) and new methodologies (Part III).  By 
putting the insights of Legal Realists and their legal pluralist 
progeny in conversation with indigenous legal and postcolonial 
legal theory as well as urban sociology and legal geography, this 
Article aims to show how (i) common law property thought has a 
long history of formation as a result of encounters with other 
systems of law and norms, and (ii) that understanding property in 
this sociological, political-economic, and historic context has 
significant implications for how common law property is employed 
today, namely with respect to unsettling assumptions around who 
gets to use property, who gets to determine the rights associated 
with that use, and what purposes property regimes should serve.  
Said differently, this Article attempts to further the Legal Realist 
project of revealing law as a constellation of non-neutral, political 
choices that must be understood in societal contexts and 
postcolonial legal theory’s commitment to unsettling dominant legal 
orthodoxies by retelling their colonial histories, tracing those 
ongoing legacies, and showing the ever-evolving global context of 
common law property doctrine and thought, its historical 
contingencies and contradictions, and its political formations and 
distributional consequences. 
Roger Cotterrell, whose insight as to the spatial disruption of 
regulatory regimes opened this Article, captures the motivation for 
an expanded frame of analysis as follows: 
[J]urisprudence needs new resources.  It must take full 
account of the social and political contexts in which 
problems about system, authority and plurality arise if it is 
to adapt to address effectively the developing transnational 
and international dimensions of law . . . Law’s authority has 
long been parasitic on the political authority of the state, 
legitimated by democratic processes.15 
But, as he notes, in the current world and state of law, “this may 
no longer be sufficient.”16 What is needed, therefore, is “to consider 
more carefully how authority can arise and the various forms it can 
take.” 17   He advocates, therefore, for a sociologically-informed 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id.  
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jurisprudence, which would “reveal[ ] authority being created in 
patterns of social interaction not necessarily regulated or supervised 
the state and often unknown to or ignored or misunderstood by 
state officials and jurists.”18 
These questions resonate with property law-related inquiries.  
Whether the question is of title claims in the settler-colonial 
context,19 the threatened extinction of community uses of land as a 
consequence of a resource extraction license,20  or the eviction of 
‘illegal’ long-time squatters from the pavement under the auspices 
of ‘urban renewal,’ ‘modernization,’ and ‘beautification,’21 property 
law claims carry in themselves a range of conflicting rights, but in 
fact more, namely an entire universe of political-normative claims 
regarding the desired social (and economic) order. 22   Seeing the 
plurality—as well as the permeability—of property and relatedly, 
the diverse sites of authority to govern it invites re-thinking of even 
entrenched property doctrines toward enable more equitable 
distribution and access. 
A word of clarification concerning the use of the term 
‘transnational’ and its multi-dimensional meaning: this Article takes 
as a starting point the term as it is often used to demarcate the global 
interactions of private actors, whether in the domains of lex 
mercatoria, through social movements, or in other constellations as 
they occur on across jurisdictional borders.23  It also engages with 
the idea of the ‘transnational’ more specifically as it refers to the 
overlapping jurisdiction of laws occupying different, often 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 See, e.g., LARISSA BEHRENDT, ACHIEVING SOCIAL JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS 
AND AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE (2003); John Borrows, Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis 
of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 37 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 537 (1999); Douglas C. 
Harris, Property and Sovereignty: An Indian Reserve and a Canadian City, 50 U.B.C. L. 
REV. 321 (2017). 
 20  See POOJA PARMAR, INDIGENEITY AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN INDIA: CLAIMS, 
HISTORIES, MEANINGS (2015). 
 21 See Okhla Factory Owners Ass’n v. Gov’t of Nat’l Capital Territory of Delhi, 
(2002) 108 DLT 517 (Delhi HC); Priya S. Gupta, Judicial Constructions: Modernity, 
Economic Liberalization, and the Urban Poor in India, 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 25 (2014). 
 22  On the plural purposes of property, in particular its value as a social 
institution, see JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, 
AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (2010). 
 23  See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956); Peer Zumbansen, 
Transnational Law, Evolving, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 898-925 
(Jan M. Smits ed., 2nd ed. 2012). 
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sometimes competing regulatory spaces24 and as it is applied to the 
tension between jurisdictional and spatial demarcations.25  In that 
sense, transnational law is treated here as a method, rather than a field 
of law. 26   While the latter would imply a “distinct regulatory 
purpose and a particular set of doctrinal rules and principles”,27 the 
former conceives of transnational law as a means of studying the 
evolution of legal actors, norms, and processes in a global context: 
[T]ransnational law is at once a legal-theoretical, 
methodological framework through which processes and 
actors of legal norm generation are scrutinized in local and 
global contexts  . . .  while it is also a critical project that seeks 
to understand the conditions under which invocations of 
‘law’ are made, contested and resisted.  This intersection of a 
theory of transnational norm making with a critique of law 
and rights in a global context is at the heart of transnational 
law and thus reveals its affinities with areas, where scholars 
increasingly turn their attention to questions of ‘sources’ of 
law, to the actual processes of norm generation and norm 
contestation and to the wide variety of actors involved.28 
 
 24 For example, while company law and labor law are both fields which in 
reality relate to an integrated corporate environment, doctrinally they are treated 
separately.  For an in-depth discussion of this fragmentation and overlap, see 
generally Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of 
Comparative Law as a Critique of Global Governance, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012). 
 25  For example, the demarcations of national jurisdictions that attempt to 
regulate online content, versus the reality of the Internet’s existence in a space that 
defies those very borders. 
 26 See Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law: Theories and Applications, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen, ed., forthcoming) 
[hereafter Zumbansen, Introduction]. 
 27 Peer Zumbansen, The Continuing Search for Law in a Globally Interconnected 
World: Engaging and Contextualizing Jessup’s ‘Transnational Law,’ in JESSUP’S BOLD 
PROPOSAL. CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH ‘TRANSNATIONAL LAW’ at 42 (Peer 
Zumbansen ed., 2020). 
 28  See Peer Zumbansen, The Continuing Search for Law in a Globally 
Interconnected World: Engaging and Contextualizing Jessup’s ‘Transnational Law,’ in 
JESSUP’S BOLD PROPOSAL. CRITICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH ‘TRANSNATIONAL LAW’ at 34 
(Peer Zumbansen ed., 2020); see also Peer Zumbansen, What Lies Before, Behind and 
Beneath a Case? Five Minutes on Transnational Lawyering and the Consequences for Legal 
Education, in STATELESS LAW: EVOLVING BOUNDARIES OF A DISCIPLINE (Helge Dedek & 
Shauna Van Praagh eds., 2016). 
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In understanding transnational law as a method and in engaging 
with research questions around norm formation and contestation, 
two further dimensions of research orientation become clearer:  that  
an interdisciplinary framework is necessary to appreciate historical, 
political, and social contexts that create law; and that doctrinal areas 
are not as easy to separate as they may first appear—emerging 
regulatory regimes cross numerous doctrinal areas and do not easily 
lend themselves to a unified conceptualization.29 
With that in mind, to “globalize” or “transnationalize” property 
involves the simultaneous treatment of multiple several critical and 
disciplinary investigations.  First, the doctrinal frames of property 
law are reassessed in terms of how boundaries are created between 
property law and concurring regulatory areas such as contract law, 
constitutional law, and investment law.  That investigation further 
reveals the embeddedness of each of these frameworks in both 
implicit and explicit assumptions regarding the prevailing socio-
economic and political order as a whole.30  Second, from this follows 
that one is confronted not with just one, however conceptually 
coherent ‘liberal’ theory of property (and a concurring historical 
narrative to provide the necessary factual evidence), but—instead—
with a host of, in themselves, distinct as well as overlapping 
genealogies of transnational property law development. 
Third, this Article will focus primarily on property rights related 
to land to illustrate how even a certain type of property that appears 
to be rooted in and bound to a particular, jurisdictionally specific 
place (immovable property), 31  is nevertheless entangled in the 
 
 29  See infra Part III’s discussion of legal pluralism; see also Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Why and How to Study Transnational Law, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 97 (2011); 
Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 3, 42-44 (Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015); 
Zumbansen, Introduction, supra note 26. 
 30  For an elaboration of the idea of relating doctrinal frameworks to the 
political economy in which they are operating and invoked, see Zumbansen, 
Introduction, supra note 26.  
 For significant political economic analyses of property law and thought, see 
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY 
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1998); FRANK K. UPHAM, THE GREAT 
PROPERTY FALLACY: THEORY, REALITY, AND GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2018); see also EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS (1975). 
 31  On the tensions wrought by the representation of land on paper from 
memory and maps to contract to title and records, see Alain Pottage, The Measure of 
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evolution of competing global property regimes.  The following 
investigation will furthermore show how, in relation to land, what 
aspects—material and cultural—are captured by a concept of 
‘property law,’ which rights and obligations are tied up in the notion 
and principle of ownership, and how in each the struggle over—and 
evolution of—diverting justifications for those rights is found. 
Fourth and finally, in using the idea of long-standing and 
overlapping genealogies of property claims in a transnational, 
border-crossing context, and in employing an interdisciplinary 
method of analysis, this Article shows how dominant ideas in 
property continue to emerge in various historically-contingent 
circumstances and then are exported and adapted through time and 
place.  With that understanding, it offers an analytical method of 
moving outside of dominant frames of understanding property law 
and seeing its plurality and its operation ‘on the ground.’  These 
dynamics are traced through colonial, economic development, and 
international political, legal, and investment encounters into the 
present day and its complex struggles over political and economic 
equality, environmental sustainability and cultural recognition—all 
of which appear to be caught up in disputes over ‘property.’32  The 
aim here is not to generalize all of property as part of one story or 
system, but rather to decenter an account of how one constellation 
of property regimes—that of common law property—in order to 
demonstrate how it has been shaped by multiple encounters of 
actors across jurisdictional borders and the normative-regulatory 
regimes that grew out of these encounters. 
The critical account provided here is primarily one of common 
law. 33   This is justified in light of the many ways in which the 
 
Land, 57 THE MODERN L. REV. 361, 362 (1994) (exploring that transformation of 
representation, which the author argues “reduc[ed] the dimensions of juridical 
ownership to paper” through contract, and with the subsequent introduction of title 
and registration, “rendered property and topography commensurable, reducing 
each to a form of notation which could be accommodated to or superimposed upon 
the other”). 
 32 See, e.g., POOJA PARMAR, INDIGENEITY AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN INDIA: CLAIMS, 
HISTORIES, MEANINGS (2015); VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE 
AND KNOWLEDGE (1997). 
 33 A truly transnational view of property should engage more deeply with 
Asian and civil law property regimes, those of the former U.S.S.R., indigenous laws, 
and other common, civil, and other legal regimes in Latin America and Africa.  
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common law of property continues to be promulgated by 
international financial institutions and other powerful international 
actors in both international and domestic regimes,34 and also with 
regard to common law property thought’s claim to an almost 
ahistorical prominence.35 
Part II puts this argument in historical context.  It opens with a 
brief reflection on the stakes involved in appreciating property in a 
globalized, transnational context before tracing several foundational 
moments of the establishment of property theory in history.  The 
dynamic of transnational property can be traced back centuries—
from Roman law36 to conquest and colonialism and more recently to 
development and investment regimes, as they unfold against an 
intricate multiplication of interests and issues.  Given the sprawling 
nature of this task, one can only point to a number of representative 
instances in such a timeline.  The modest aim here, rather than 
following the thread through each particular reference point, is 
instead to argue for reorientation of our perception.  In other words, 
this Article will attempt to shift our gaze to the plurality of 
evolutionary thread(s), as they form the background for each 
concrete encounter with “property.”  This, this Article will do by 
singling out three landmark but also ongoing moments of property 
encounters and lawmaking:  conquest, colonialism & development, 
and international investment. 
In search of a better grasp of the nature of the evolving property 
law regimes in a transnational context, particular emphasis is placed 
on the way in which often violent encounters between certain actors 
are the outset of newly formulated as well as rejected property law 
 
Limitations of scope and expertise have limited this Chapter primarily to common 
law regimes in the United States, Canada, Australia, and India, and to influences 
found in transnational law.  It is this author’s hope that future projects can engage 
with a wider variety of legal traditions. 
 34 See, e.g., David Kennedy, Some Caution About Property Rights as a Recipe for 
Economic Development, 1 ACCOUNTING, ECON. & L. 1 (2011); Monica Eppinger, 
Property and Political Community: Democracy, Oligarchy, and the Case of Ukraine, 47 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 825 (2015); Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting The Ownership 
Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59 
(2007). 
 35 See, e.g., ALEXANDER 1998, supra note 30; PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY 
OF MODERN LAW (2002). 
 36  See Anna DiRobilant, The Building Blocks of European Property Law: The 
Roman Conceptual Vocabulary of Property (draft paper, on file with author). 
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rules, norms, and principles.  Studying these encounters as sites of 
law-making highlights the importance of historical facticity and the 
contingency in the formation of ‘property law’ and connects this 
project to concurring efforts in a growing range of areas to study the 
generation of law making from within concrete sites of conflictual 
encounter, such as in commercial arbitration and lex mercatoria37 as 
well as alternative dispute resolution.38 
Once common law property thought is presented as historically 
contingent, hybrid, and encompassing a variety of overlapping 
doctrines, Part III puts the argument in methodological context.  
Drawing on a host of conceptual and analytical frameworks to help 
in this endeavor—comparative legal analysis, legal geography, legal 
anthropology, the sociology of law, postcolonial theory, and legal 
pluralism—it distills four lenses through which it is proposed an 
analysis of globalized property regimes should be approached:  the 
‘diffusion of law’; the plurality of law and its constituent norms; 
postcolonial ‘everyday lived’ experiences of urban property; and 
law’s proliferation in terms of norm creation and norm 
implementation beyond the state. 
The analysis concludes in Part IV by returning to the correlation 
of sovereignty and property, which has been a well-known staple in 
critical legal analysis.  With the help of the foregoing critique of 
transnational property law regimes as sites of continuing conflict, 
one will be able to capture more effectively how the new legal 
structures arising out of conflictual encounters can be seen to 
perpetuate the allocation of resources with a ‘normalizing’ effect, 
rendering them more immune against critique while precluding 
more equitable distribution.  The power relationships that are 
encoded in law through these encounters ultimately determine 
access to property and resources.  Our analysis will show that 
 
 37 Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias 
Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L. J. 419 (2000); Ralf Michaels, The 
True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 447 (2007). 
 38  For various discussions on alternative dispute resolution in different 
contexts, see, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the 
Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009); Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against 
Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1143 (2009); Amy J. Cohen, The Family, The Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 
91 (2011); Sari M. Graben, Assessing Stakeholders Participation in Sub-Arctic Co-
Management: Administrative Rulemaking and Private Agreements, 29 WINDSOR YB. 
ACCESS. JUST. 195 (2011). 
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property law’s normalizing tendencies have detrimental 
consequences for the way in which societal, racial, class, gender, and 
other hierarchies are constituted and institutionalized. 
2. HISTORY: LANDMARKS, INEQUITIES, AND CONTINUITIES IN 
PROPERTY REGIMES THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL ENCOUNTERS 
Property law regarding land, as it located in particular place, is 
often theorized within an implied domestic frame.39  Applications of 
property law usually refer to the local statutes and law as embedded 
within the larger national jurisdiction, and rarely beyond that to 
international regimes, or to other jurisdictions. 40   However, the 
innumerable instances over centuries of individuals and corporate 
and other entities crossing borders (and oceans) and laying claims 
to property belie the simplicity of focusing solely on the domestic 
jurisdiction of property.  It is not just that the domestic jurisdiction 
adapts by merely recognizing the ‘owner’ as a foreign entity, but 
rather that with that claim and negotiation, new forms of 
jurisdiction41 are shaped, new ideas around who can rightfully make 
a claim to what and how, new norms around the meaning of 
‘ownership,’ and what the actual—explicit or implicit—regulatory 
purpose is of a property regime appear to easily cross boundaries, 
diffuse, and settle.42  By shifting our attention away from the specific 
 
 39  An eloquent exception is Patrick McAuslan, Property and Empire: From 
Colonialism to Globalization and Back, 24 SOC. & L. STUD. 339 (2015). 
 Constitutional law literature that often includes discussions on the crafting of 
property clauses, see, e.g., Heinz Klug, Defining the Property Rights of Others: Political 
Power, Indigenous Tenure and the Construction of Customary Land Law, 35 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM 119 (1995).  Postcolonial and indigenous legal literature will be discussed 
below; note engagements with the idea of property as a human or international 
right, including SPRANKLING, supra note 8. 
 40 Courts might engage in comparative analysis when they are faced with a 
new issue, but it is rare to see explicit appreciation of the connections between 
apparently domestic issues to larger global contexts and patterns in pursuit of legal 
solutions. 
 41 See generally  SHAUNNAGH DORSETT & SHAUN MCVEIGH, JURISDICTION (2012) 
(providing an overarching discussion the historical development of the concept of 
jurisdiction and the various forms that it takes). 
 42  For an insightful conceptualization of the way in which norms and 
regulatory regimes “settle,” see Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 29; see also Terence 
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locational jurisdiction of the object of property and, instead, towards 
at the processes of the formation of those ideas, one can begin to 
discern how property thought and property regimes have been 
profoundly shaped by such encounters.  This analysis implies that 
current differentiation of property law into, say, personal, real, and 
intellectual property is but a superficial reflection of the deeper roots 
the various dimensions of property law have in historical struggles 
and that therefore one ought to review one’s assertions regarding 
the different forms of holding property (including owning, renting, 
and licensing) as well as the various regulatory regimes associated 
with property (for example, those associated with intellectual 
property registration, mortgages, investment, and securitization). 
This living history of seemingly timeless ideas and evolving 
practices around the invocation, rejection, and consolidation of 
property claims is necessarily a story of its different actors and their 
varying roles within these stories.  The property norms that operate 
at multiple levels of governance—local, national, international, and 
transnational—continue to play key roles in changing policy 
priorities of nation-state governments, international organizations, 
and global investors.  From each vantage point, the stakes of 
property differ, as states clamor for foreign capital, and international 
development and financial organizations strive for the ideal mix of 
support and incentives, while hedge funds, real estate developers, 
and private equity pools seek out profitable placement 
opportunities with  the least possible degree of “red tape” and yet 
also certainty regarding legal enforcement of property and contract 
claims.43  Property regimes continue to arise, expand, and adapt in 
response to these different forces of influence.  But, the more 
property law regimes are thought of as border-crossing, 
“spatialized” realms of economic and actual power,44 questions of 
political agency, of accountability, and legitimacy appear to become 
more opaque. 
Depending on the political economic context in which the 
conflict over “property” is carried out, property’s “public” 
 
Halliday, The Recursivity of Law: Global Lawmaking and National Lawmaking in the 
Globalization of Bankruptcy, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007). 
 43  See, e.g., DOREEN MASSEY, WORLD CITY (2007); RAHUL MEHROTRA, 
ARCHITECTURE IN INDIA: SINCE 1990 (2011). 
 44  See, e.g., DOREEN MASSEY, FOR SPACE (2005); SARAH KEENAN, SUBVERSIVE 
PROPERTY: LAW AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACES OF BELONGING (2015). 
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dimension—what Morris Cohen described in 1927 as property’s 
affinity with sovereignty—varies in its visibility.45  For Cohen and 
other Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s it was evident that the 
concentration of power that results from the allocation of rights to 
property to private actors is significant and should therefore be 
understood as a form of sovereign power.  Building upon insights 
from Robert Hale and fellow Legal Realists as well as political 
economists of the earlier Progressive Era such as Richard Ely and 
John Commons, Cohen argued that those who own property 
exercise “power over the life of others” by determining rents, prices, 
and even the command of services through their payment for 
labor.46  Through taxation and the ability to command services and 
the states’ protection of these processes, Cohen’s argument goes, 
“we have the essence of what historically has constituted political 
sovereignty.”47 
The Realists’ analysis, for all the lessons it bears, is not without 
its limitations—especially against the background of the type of 
state transformation that has come to mark Western nation states in 
the second half of the twentieth century.  With a wholesale shift 
“from government to governance” and an ever-expanding sphere of 
private assumption of formerly public services (and assets), the 
differences between private power and public authority have 
become ambivalent.  Over the past few decades, sovereignty has 
become further diffused across a plurality of private actors, who in 
turn have been taking on more and more of what was formerly 
under state responsibility or, at least, effective control.  The more 
recent critique by scholars such as Claire Cutler and Fleur Johns of 
lex mercatoria’s success in rendering real power differentials in the 
transnational realm invisible 48  echoes and expands upon the 
concerns raised by progressive legal scholars and political scientists 
 
 45 See Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8 (1927). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 13. 
 48  See Fleur Johns, Performing Power: The Deal, Corporate Rule, and the 
Constitution of Global Legal Order, 34 J.L. & SOC. 116 (2007); A. Claire Cutler, Legal 
Pluralism as the “Common Sense” of Transnational Capitalism, 3 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL 
SERIES 719 (2013); A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: 
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003) 
[hereinafter CUTLER 2003]. 
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a hundred years before with regard to the national context. 49  
Building on the  critique of market power in the domestic context50 
by Legal Realists, this transnational revival of the scrutiny of 
“private power” draws attention to how, as observed by  Cutler, 
“private authority” has remained mostly outside the ambit of critical 
(international) law 51  in large part because of the (perceived) 
divisions between public and private spheres of law and subjects:  
“[t]he authority of corporate law and transnational corporations, the 
major agents of corporate power, are minimized by statist political 
theories that discount the political significance of such corporations 
and by legal theories that do not regard them as legitimate ‘subjects’ 
or ‘sources’ of law.”52 
The divide in perception between public and private and the 
disproportionate focus on state-centric conceptions of sovereignty is 
an impediment to the development of a viable theory of democratic 
accountability vis-à-vis private power.  Public International Law 
appears, in the face of rapid privatization and market-based and 
self-regulation, unable to  adequately “check” private power in the 
transnational sphere on account of its continued focus on state 
agency and its confidence in political accountability even in the 
absence of a viable form of global government. 53   Moreover, as 
Cutler argues, these private actors are not passively gaining 
authority—rather, they are “deeply implicated in the ordering of 
state-society relations” in that they “operate to recast ‘public’  
concerns as ‘private.’”54  By doing so, they effectively remain outside 
 
 49  See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POLI. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial 
Minorities, 20 COL. L. REV. 451 (1920); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and 
Economic Liberty, 43 COL. L. REV. 603 (1943); John P. Dawson, Unconscionable 
Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976); John P. Dawson, 
Economic Duress: An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253 (1947). 
 50 See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (2002); Peer Zumbansen, 
The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 
(2007). 
 51 See Fleur Johns, The Invisibility of The Transnational Corporation: An Analysis 
of International Law and Legal Theory, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 893 (1994) [hereinafter Johns 
1994]; see also discussion in Part I.C. below. 
 52 CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 5. 
 53 See Johns 1994, supra note 51; see also discussion in Part I.C. below. 
 54 CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 5. 
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the purview of “democratic methods of scrutiny and review.”55  As 
noted, this shift in power and the attending dilemmas regarding 
accountability and “public” oversight is a phenomenon occurring 
within and beyond the nation state and, as such, a prime example of 
what Saskia Sassen referred to as the place “where the work of 
globalization gets done.”56  Cutler’s analysis cogently highlights the 
connections between the domestic and the transnational and 
exposes the limitations of an international legal framework oriented 
around state action.  On both accounts, one is faced with the result 
that while there might be increased awareness of the rise of power 
exercised by private actors, the actual diffusion of that power and 
the ambivalent status of agency challenges rule-of-law based 
concepts of accountability, while the association of private power 
with the ordinary business of market functionality effectively 
neutralizes political critique. 
Despite the critique offered by the Progressives and the Legal 
Realists and those whose work follows in their tradition today, the 
dominant view that private property is separate from public ideas 
of governance remains in place today.  That ownership actually 
implies an exercise of power over non-owners is rarely accounted 
for in property regimes whose underlying values are the protection 
of that ownership, rather than the balancing of that power.57  While 
political sovereignty has been conceptualized as entwined with the 
classic dimensions of control of territory and people, 58  private 
exercises of sovereignty over territory and people are far less 
accounted for in the law.  Balancing the power exercised by private 
owners through regulation of use or redistribution of resources is 
often seen as an infringement of their private property rights, rather 
 
 55 CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 5. 
 56 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 
27, 35 (2005). 
 57  See Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853 
(2012); ALEXANDER 1998, supra note 30. 
 58 See Joseph W. Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (1991); 
Borrows 1999, supra note 19; Harris 2017, supra note 19.  For a critique of the concept 
of sovereignty from a postcolonial perspective, see Brenna Bhandar, The Conceit of 
Sovereignty: Toward Post-Colonial Technique, in STORIED COMMUNITIES: NARRATIVES OF 
CONTACT AND ARRIVAL IN CONSTITUTING POLITICAL COMMUNITY (Hester Lessard et 
al. eds., 2011). 
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than an integral part of a property regime.59  This idea is crucial to 
the approach to legal analysis offered here.  As will be seen below, 
once newly-arrived global actors (in current times, mostly private 
corporate ones) are able to establish an enforceable claim to land or 
other property superior to that of domestic actors who were 
previously using that property, a sphere of sovereign control is 
created, cities and landscapes shaped, resources are allocated, and 
societies are re-ordered, all raising crucial questions of transparency, 
accountability, and democratic processes of decision-making in 
those transformations.60 
The Legal Realists and those who have followed in their 
tradition have revealed much concerning the contradictions 
inherent in common law regimes and in liberalism more generally.  
What the following historical analysis attempts to add is the 
significance of the role of conquest and colonialism in shaping 
common law property thought and its contradictions—
circumstances that are largely ignored in the Realist canon.  One 
might consider this relative under-engagement in light of what 
postcolonial political theorist Uday Singh Mehta called the 
“neglected link” between liberalism and empire. 61   In the very 
moment that the British, Dutch, and French “rightly conceived of 
themselves as having elaborated and integrated into their societies 
of political freedom,” they also “pursued and held vast empires 
where such freedoms were either absent or severely attenuated.”62  
It is the legacy of those empires (and their underlying justifications) 
on property regimes that implicates conquest and colonialism as 
ever-relevant to a transnational analysis, and that benefits from 
analyses drawn from indigenous and postcolonial legal theories. 
Several specific reasons for this engagement can be delineated.  
First, the ill-fitted property regimes enacted by colonial powers to 
govern their colonial subjects continue to have legacies in current 
property regimes in the Global North and Global South, as well as 
in regimes that cross their boundaries.  Moreover, the acquisition of 
property rights—alongside the imposition of common law 
 
 59 See ALEXANDER 1998 supra note 30; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, NO FREEDOM 
WITHOUT REGULATION: THE HIDDEN LESSON OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2015). 
 60 See CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 13. 
 61 See UDAY SINGH MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT (1999). 
 62 Id. at 7. 
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conceptions of property—played an important role in expanding 
conquest and colonial efforts.  And relatedly, the re-conception and 
acquisition of property rights continue to be of concern today in 
areas such as intellectual property that have been criticized as neo-
imperial.63  With regards to the legacy of conquest of indigenous 
land and peoples on current law, the connection is even more direct, 
as the occupation of their land continues today with scarce 
reparation.64 
Second, the conquest and colonial encounters are integral to this 
analysis of property because the underlying assumptions of many 
colonial-era property laws continue to be in operation through 
international development and investment projects.  As has been 
well-observed by Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Sundhya Pahuja, M. 
Sornarajah and other scholars contributing to theories of “Third 
World Approaches to International Law”,65 domestic laws in former 
colonies as well as international development projects and 
investment arrangements since the post War period in many ways 
mark continuities of rather than disjunctures from colonial projects 
of dominance and control of powerful groups.  The continuity of 
exploitation occurs, for example: as natural and other resources are 
 
 63 See discussion supra Part II. 
 64 See, e.g., PATRICK MACKLEM, INDIGENOUS DIFFERENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
OF CANADA (2001).  For a fascinating theorization of indigenous claims to land and 
the imposition of state legal institutions in India, see PARMAR 2015, supra note 32.  
For powerful accounts of the ongoing discriminatory treatment of the property and 
sovereignty of Native Americans, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: 
THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN 
AMERICA (2005); Singer 1991, supra note 58; Jedediah Purdy, Property and Empire: The 
Law of Imperialism in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2007). 
 65  Third World Approaches to International Law re-theorizes public 
international law from plural vantage points in the Global South, including by 
retelling the history of its making and the significance of colonialism, tracing the 
legacies of colonialism in international law today, and critiquing current 
development orthodoxy in law and policy.  On TWAIL generally, see Makau 
Mutua, What is TWAIL? 94 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASIL ANNUAL MEETING 31 (2000); 
Obiora C. Okafor, Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): 
Theory, Methodology, or Both? 10 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 371 (2008); James T. Gathii, 
TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative 
Bibliography, 3 TRADE L. & DEV. 26 (2011).  For specific engagement with how 
international development, investment, and public international law continue 
colonial legacies of power differentials, elite class structures, and resource 
extraction, see Pahuja 2013, supra note 4; BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 
(2003); SORNARAJAH, supra note 7. 
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further siphoned off to the Global North; 66  through 
intergovernmental organizations that are meant to encourage fair 
multilateral negotiation (such as the WTO) but perpetuate structures 
of unequal bargaining between Global North and South;67 and, as 
non-reciprocal concessions in trade and investment are made 
through coercive demands on Global South for regulatory parity 
with Global North states. 68   The network of domestic and 
transnational laws that support development projects (such as large 
infrastructure construction, extraction of natural resources, and 
sovereign debt lending) and legal regimes for investment appear to 
be value-neutral and in accordance with “accepted practices” of 
common law supporting capital movement and freer trade, despite 
the political choices and values that underly them. 
Finally and most expansively, the critical engagements of 
indigenous and postcolonial theory with the laws of conquest and 
colonialism enable one to better see the power differentials and 
racial and ethnic inequality between (and within) the Global North 
and the Global South, and the entrenchment of those differentials in 
law and legal theory. 69   With that appreciation comes an 
understanding of the “postcolonial” that is not tied literally to 
whether a given place was colonized or not, but rather an 
understanding that serves as a lens through which to see 
“oppression of all communities historically treated as racially and 
ethnically inferior to Europeans.”70 
The last point warrants a brief further explanation.  How can one 
understand the relationship between postcolonial theory and law? 
Eve Darian-Smith writes of the efforts of scholars of postcolonial law 
 
 66 See discussion supra note 6, for further discourse on mining. 
 67 For example, in negotiations around agricultural goods and textiles.  For a 
historical analysis of the international regulatory treatment of sugar from a TWAIL 
perspective, see MICHAEL FAKHRI, SUGAR AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW (2014). 
 68 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7. 
 69 As Eve Darian-Smith has written, “This shift in terminology [from colonial/ 
colonized to GN and GS] expands the lens of analysis from state-centered law in 
the context of specific national colonial enterprises to a more global post-
Westphalian worldview that takes into account transnational, regional, and state 
interrelations.” Eve Darian-Smith, Postcolonial Law in 18 INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 647 (James D. Wright ed., 
1998) (citing Falk). 
 70 Id. 
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to engage with “the underlying orientalist assumptions in national 
and international law that affirm essentialized constructions of 
cultural difference.” 71  In Darian-Smith’s words, “what links the 
legacy of postcolonial studies to contemporary analyses of legal 
orientalism is a central focus on the endurance of historically 
structured racial and ethnic divides between Western and non-
Western societies despite a growing appreciation of their respective 
interdependencies.” 72  That understanding captures two relevant 
ideas in postcolonial theory:  the transnational nature of legal 
“interdependencies” and the appreciation of ideas of cultural, racial, 
and ethnic difference (specifically ideas around superiority); and 
how both are constructed and perpetuated.  Both of these 
dimensions reflect the need for a theory of transnational property 
law to engage with postcolonial theory. 
Edward Said’s concept of “orientalism”73 remains ever relevant 
here in enabling one to see how Global North conceptualizes Global 
South, and vice versa, and how each conceptualize themselves in 
response to the mirror they see reflected.  What, more specifically, 
does that imply for property regimes? In part, the dialectical 
dynamic of seeing described by Said sustains the myth of coherent, 
ahistorical common law property thought by (to put it bluntly) 
holding former colonies to a standard of coherence and 
enforceability that is not even present in the Global North countries 
in whose image the regimes are enacted.74  For example, in economic 
development and investment policy literature, one often finds 
chastisement of so-called developing countries for not having 
strong, enforceable property rights and clear title.  While this may 
sound fairly neutral, not only does it mask how formality of 
property has often been used as a way to disenfranchise the 
 
 71 Id. citing Ruskola, 2002. 
 72 Id. 
 73  EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ORIENT 
(1978). 
 74 See generally Frank Upham, Mythmaking In The Rule Of Law Orthodoxy 7 
(CARNEGIE WORKING PAPERS: RULE OF LAW SERIES, DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW 
PROJECT, No. 30, 2002) (discussing the perpetuation of the myth that “rule of law” 
means legal certainty that exists in places such as the United States when, in 
actuality, that ‘certainty’ is not as present as it would seem). 
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marginalized,75 it also does not acknowledge the contradictions in 
the Global North countries themselves who advocate for those 
reforms, such as their own selective enforcement.76 
2.1. Conquest, Law, and Sovereignty 
This Section introduces several selected examples of conflictual 
encounters between European conquerors and indigenous 
populations and their land, in the process of which property law 
conceptions were both transplanted and imported as well as 
reshaped and newly constituted.  These brief examples are meant 
demonstrate how the consolidation of two now dominant concepts 
of property actually took place:  (i) the relationship between the idea 
of “use” of land and racial hierarchy and (ii) the entwinement of 
property and sovereignty.  The examples below were chosen 
because of their articulations of legal justifications for the claiming 
of dominion over land.  They are meant to provide an account—
albeit cursory and incomplete—of historical circumstances in order 
to illustrate how political claims to land came to be justified and 
legalized.  This engagement with conquest provides the necessary 
background for the analysis of conflictual encounters over the use of 
land, further explored in relation to Global South cities in the next 
Part. 
The evolution of the legal regimes that Europeans used to justify 
the conquest and claims over indigenous land unfolded over several 
centuries, with different trajectories in different geographies.  In the 
16th and 17th centuries, it was well established amongst European 
states that land could be “taken” if it was unoccupied or 
abandoned.77  As for land that was possessed by inhabitants, that 
idea of possession as implying rights of ownership would give way 
 
 75 See discussion in Part III.C; see also Priya S. Gupta, The Peculiar Circumstances 
of Eminent Domain in India, 49 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 445 (2011) (discussing debates over 
the status of property rights during the drafting of the Indian Constitution). 
 76 Laura Underkuffler, Keynote at The Annual Meeting of the Association for 
Property, Law, and Society (2015); Upham 2002, supra note 74. 
 77 See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-71 (5th 
ed. 1998); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (discussing the philosophical underpinnings 
and justification behind the original creation of legal property). 
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to a requirement of “occupation.” There were several interpretations 
amongst European nations of what constituted occupation over the 
following centuries.  Most well-known is that of John Locke, whose 
interpretation required labor related to the land in order to claim 
legal occupancy. 78   Another concept of occupancy came from 
international legal theorist Emmerich de Vattel in the 18th century, 
who argued that indigenous peoples could not claim legal 
possession (and therefore occupancy) of the land on account of their 
apparent lack of permanent residence or use.79  As Patrick Macklem 
has noted, the latter conception of occupancy is known as the 
“notice” theory in that the kinds of use required for occupancy were 
meant to be apparent to European countries.80  As the Americas and 
what would become Australia, New Zealand, and surrounding 
islands were clearly inhabited by indigenous peoples, the 
understanding of “occupied” had to be one that conformed to those 
European norms of agricultural use and (visible) residence if it were 
to be used to serve the purpose of conquest.81 
Various justifications were offered for taking land from 
populations deemed to be “uncivilized” through the vessel of 
“occupation.” 82  Among those justifications, two in particular 
continue to have legacies in later American, Australian, and 
Canadian jurisprudence.  First was the idea that the legitimacy of a 
claim to property was tied to how it was being used by the 
claimant—ie., for gathering, agriculture, or something else or 
apparently not at all.  Understanding the evolution of “use” 
therefore necessitates a closer look at what ‘occupation’ entailed, 
how it was justified, and how both the content and justification 
evolved over time.  Second is the idea that the hierarchy of race, 
 
 78 LOCKE, supra note 77. 
 79 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS Bk. 1, Chap. 18 at ¶ 209 (1758). 
 80  MACKLEM, supra note 64, at 80; see also CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND 
PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 11-23 
(1994) (discussing theories of the origin of legal property). 
 81 See MACKLEM, supra note 64 (discussing the history of the legal significance 
of occupancy, as well as highlighting an argument that Aboriginal prior occupancy 
possesses more legal significance than it has been accorded in Canadian law). 
 82  See generally ANDREW FITZMAURICE, SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE, 
1500–2000 (2014) (discussing the many justifications offered to support the 
confiscation of land from indigenous peoples during European colonial expansion). 
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culture, and religion of the claimant was relevant to the designation 
of their claim as inferior.83 
The idea that occupation gave rise to a claim to property was 
central to European expansion during the 16th-19th centuries,84 with 
shifting justifications for the exercise of such claims.  At first 
justifications around the taking of land were primarily tied to 
religious and cultural superiority. 85   That perceived cultural 
superiority was then used to expand claims from occupation to 
forms of rule over populations.  The associated reasoning shifted 
away from religion as time went on and political theories had to be 
reconciled with new forms of commercial life in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, as Andrew Fitzmaurice explains. 86   As part of this 
reconciliation, occupation began to be linked to the use of property 
as opposed to mere inhabitance or holding of the land, above all by 
rendering the land fit for agricultural purposes—“English agrarian 
capitalism” in Brenna Bhandar’s account.87  The idea of occupation 
was transformed to indicate uses of land that which ‘improved’ it—
or ‘developed’ it, as one might say today. 88   By consequence, a 
 
 83 See Singer 1991, supra note 58, at 44-55 (discussing a characterization of the 
U.S. property regime as a system of “racial caste” in relation to Native Americans); 
MACKLEM, supra note 64, ch. 4 (discussing the belief that cultural superiority 
justified the Canadian exercise of sovereignty); cf. Brian Slattery, Paper Empires: The 
Legal Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America, in DESPOTIC 
DOMINION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES (John McLaren, A.R. Buck 
& Nancy E. Wright eds., 2005) (discussing religious justifications for the seizure of 
land from native peoples during the colonization of the Americas).  For a 
fascinating, comprehensive argument of how the entwinement of property and race 
in colonization involved more than just racial domination in territorial claims and 
colonial exercises of sovereignty, but rather the relationship was a dialectical one 
and was fundamental to political, social, and other forms of racial domination, see 
Bhandar 2011, supra note 58, at 66-88. 
 84 FITZMAURICE, supra note 82, at 2-3. 
 85 FITZMAURICE, supra note 82, at 8; LOCKE, supra note 77. 
 86 FITZMAURICE, supra note 82.  See also Purdy 2007, supra note 64. 
 87 BRENNA BHANDAR, COLONIAL LIVES OF PROPERTY: LAW, LAND, AND RACIAL 
REGIMES OF OWNERSHIP 35 (2018). 
 88 LOCKE, supra note 77. Robert Williams has argued that Locke served to 
justify common law property thought deeming that Native Americans did not have 
full property rights because they had not “developed” it and they did not recognize 
the same form of rights of ownership that common law did.  Robert A. Williams Jr, 
Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism And Colonialism 
in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989).  Brenna 
Bhandar provides a fascinating historical account of Irish political economist 
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society that occupied the land by improving upon it was seen to hold 
a superior right to property.  Underlying this justification was the 
belief of cultural and civilizational superiority, which was believed 
to manifest itself through how societies used land. 89   Bhandar 
eloquently captures that link between improvement of land and 
assumed civilizational superiority by arguing that the English 
moved toward a scientific method of quantification of valuation of 
land and people and “created an ideological juggernaut that defined 
people and land as unproductive in relation to agricultural 
production and deemed them to be waste and in need of 
improvement.”90  From here, she further argues, “ownership and 
subjectivity” were fused together “in a way that had devasting 
consequences for entire populations who did not cultivate their 
lands for the purposes of commercial trade and marketized 
exchange.”91 
The combination of cultural superiority and the idea that non-
agricultural use was of lesser worth than agricultural use created a 
lens through which land seen as unused was therefore considered 
empty.  To perceive of such land as terra nullius92—empty land—
stood in stark contrast to generations of indigenous people living on 
it, and yet it served in a circular way in certain geographies to justify 
the idea that such land had just been ‘discovered’ and could 
therefore be occupied and claimed by Europeans.  Once the 
occupation of the conquerors was established, so too was 
‘dominion’—the right to control land.  Dominion also, though, came 
to mean a claim to the exercise of sovereignty—not exclusive 
sovereignty but a form of sovereignty nonetheless—over people of 
that land as well.  Over time, exercising control over those people 
 
William Petty’s linking an apparent lack of cultivation of land by the Irish to 
justifications for English conquest.  BHANDAR 2018, supra note 87, in particular 
Chapter 1. 
 89 FITZMAURICE, supra note at 82, at 3 (noting that the indigenous were seen to 
have “moved from ‘hypothetical state of nature to an agricultural state”). 
 90 BHANDAR 2018, supra note 87, at 35. 
 91 BHANDAR 2018, supra note 87, at 35. 
 92 Note that in Fitzmaurice’s account, he is careful to trace how the use of the 
term in this way did not emerge until much later, at which time it was applied 
retroactively to justify conquest.  On at least five different characterizations by 
historians on how terra nullius was used, including discussion around Fitzmaurice’s 
account, see Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, Acquiring Empire by Law: From 
Roman Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 1 (2010). 
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entirely—ruling them—added imperium to some exercises of 
dominion in settler colonialism.93  
Because the concept of “occupation” evolved in a way that 
encompassed sovereignty and imperium, this meant that the 
(imposed) laws of conquest represented entwined regimes of 
property and international legal claims.  The justifications that were 
offered for the taking of land (the idea of use and racial superiority) 
as well as the imposition of imperial rule continue to have a legacy 
in how common law property law prioritizes claims to land today 
as well as engagements with indigenous sovereignty.94 
In Australia, that sovereignty over territory (and eventually over 
people) was blurred with Crown ownership of the land itself, as 
recounted by the Australian High Court in the 1992 Mabo v 
Queensland case concerning indigenous claims to title. 95   Justice 
Brennan, writing for three of the six justices in the majority, reviews 
the history of the Crown’s claims to sovereignty over the land 
inhabited by the indigenous Meriam people through the use of terra 
nullius and the subsequent recognition of those claims by Australian 
Courts in the following centuries.96  He then turns to the various 
justifications for the “acquisition of sovereignty over the territory of 
‘backward peoples,’” including the “benefits of Christianity and 
European civilization” and the idea that “Europeans had a right to 
bring lands into production if they were left uncultivated by the 
 
 93  DAVID B. ABERNETHY, THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL DOMINANCE: EUROPEAN 
OVERSEAS EMPIRES 1415–1980 185-88 (2000); see Patrick McAuslan, In the Beginning 
was the Law . . . An Intellectual Odyssey, Draft Paper for The Practice of Law and 
Development: Socio-Legal Approaches Conf. held at Cornell Univ. (Apr. 18-20, 2004), 
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=e
alccs_pld [https://perma.cc/8H4D-FEDU]; see Purdy 2007, supra note 64; see also 
Matthew Craven, Colonialism and Domination, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 862-89 (Bardo Fassbender, Anne Peters, Simone 
Peter, & Daniel Högger eds., 2012) (discussing the creation of legal structures 
justifying and legitimizing colonial and imperial activity). 
 94 See, e.g., Ivana Isailović, Indigenous Peoples’ Claims and Challenges over Control 
of Property, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND LAW 436-53 (Ugo 
Mattei & John D. Haskell eds., 2015). 
 95 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at Brennan op., ¶¶ 45-56.  The 
Court cites Roberts-Wray to explain the blurring of the “distinction between the 
Crown’s title to a colony and the Crown’s ownership of land in the colony.”  Id. at 
¶ 45. 
 96  Id. at Brennan op., ¶ 33.  The discussion included a reference to U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall’s Worcester v. Georgia.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 
U.S. 515, 543-44 (1832). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/2
2020] Globalizing Property 641 
   
 
indigenous inhabitants.” 97   Based on that understanding of the 
“backwardness” of the population and the characterization of their 
use of the land as not cultivated,98 the doctrine of terra nullius was 
expanded to include land that had been inhabited.  This expanded 
view of terra nullius based the idea of habitation on the presence of 
law—more specifically, on a “hypothesis being that there was no 
local law already in existence in the territory” of indigenous 
people.99 
In the end, in recognition that “the common law should neither 
be nor be seen as frozen in an age of racial discrimination,”100  the 
Mabo Court re-instated indigenous title on lands where the title had 
not already been legally extinguished, which was meant to overturn 
the expanded application of the doctrine of terra nullius to lands 
inhabited by indigenous people in Australia.101 
How does this brief account of the evolution of legal 
justifications for the conquest of already-occupied land and 
sovereign peoples contribute to an understanding of property as 
transnational?  The history told by the Australian High Court is a 
rich account of how the transnational encounters between the British 
and the indigenous people—in effect, a claim over land and people 
across jurisdictional borders—resulted in the creation of new 
(unjust) law and a sanctioned exercise of sovereignty that would be 
applied over centuries not only in what would become Australia but 
in other geographies as well.  The account also reveals the historical 
circulation of ideas regarding indigenous property holdings.  With 
 
 97 Id. at Brennan op., ¶ 33.  The Court also noted that land in this case had in 
fact been gardened.  Id. 
 98 Id.  The Court stated that the land was uncultivated despite the fact that it 
had been gardened.  Id.  Not only was this circular reasoning—because the 
population was seen as ‘backward’, their use couldn’t have been cultivation—but 
also, note the double meaning of ‘cultivated’. 
 99  Id. at ¶ 36 (citations omitted).  Per this hypothesis, “the indigenous 
inhabitants of a settled colony had no recognized sovereign, else the territory could 
have been acquired only by conquest or cession.  The indigenous people of a settled 
colony were thus taken to be without laws, without a sovereign and primitive in 
their social organization.”  Id.  The Court also noted that this doctrine remained 
intact, despite the findings of later courts that there had, in fact, been indigenous 
law in existence at the time in question.  Id. at ¶¶ 37-38. 
 100 Id. at ¶ 42. 
 101 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at Order.  See generally LARISSA 
BEHRENDT, ACHIEVING SOCIAL JUSTICE: INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND AUSTRALIA’S FUTURE 
(2003) (detailing the ongoing conflict despite the Mabo ruling). 
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regard to the justifications of the use of terra nullius, and the histories 
of encounters with indigenous people, the Court draws on cases 
from other jurisdictions through history as well as in then-present 
times, including the United States, India, and Jamaica.  In the re-
telling of historical moments when terra nullius came to be and was 
expanded, international jurists such as Vattel, Vitoria, and 
Blackstone were drawn upon in the various opinions.102 
In the United States, while the concept of terra nullius was less 
explicitly drawn upon by judges,103 a constellation of ideas around 
legitimate use and claims were transformed into a legal regime that 
limited the rights and the sovereignty of Native Americans.  
Through these cases one sees how the application of a particular 
concept of property—the designation of use—to the act of taking 
ownership of land resulted not only in justifying the act but in 
making it legal.  This legal formation can be traced across several 
cases written by Chief Justice John Marshall in the early 1800s.104  
The first, Johnson v. M’Intosh in 1823, offered Marshall’s own account 
of several stages of discovery and conquest and the associated rights 
of Native Americans,105 before holding that Native Americans had 
rights of possession but not full property rights.  Marshall’s ruling 
limited their right to alienate their property to only the United States 
federal government.  Marshall explicitly justifies this abridgment of 
the full rights attached to title by reference to the lack of cultivation 
of the land as well as the “savage” nature of the Native Americans.106 
 
 102 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 at ¶ 33-35 (Brennan opinion); 
id. at ¶ 11 (Deane and Gaudron opinion) in particular.  
 103 Stuart Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropology and Property Law in Early 
Australia, 23 L. & HIST. REV. 95 (2005). 
 104 See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 105 See Slattery’s Paper Empires for a rich review of Marshall’s linear stages of 
discovery and conquest in the context of Spain, France, and Britain’s changing 
justifications and doctrines of conquest.  Brian Slattery, Paper Empires: The Legal 
Dimensions of French and English Ventures in North America, in DESPOTIC DOMINION: 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES (John McLaren, A.R. Buck & Nancy E. 
Wright eds., 2005). 
 106  Marshall refers to the Native Americans as “fierce savages whose 
occupation was war and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest.”  
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823).  See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., THE 
AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 
(1992).  Following Jedediah Purdy’s argument, that characterization of 
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Jedediah Purdy reads Johnson v. M’Intosh as “not just a property 
case” but also as “the leading American case in the law of 
imperialism.”107  Purdy argues that Johnson should be read as an 
encounter between the “competing claims of representatives of two 
political societies, one dominant, the other subordinate, within an 
extended system of such domination” and that “the question of the 
case is not which political society will prevail, but what concessions 
the dominant society will make to the subordinate one.”108   His 
reading is even more convincing when one considers the legacy of 
the case and the hierarchy it imposed through its distinguishing of 
rights to property based on indigenous status.  That legacy can be 
traced through the Dawes Act of 1887 which split up Native 
American landholdings into individual tracts to the current laws 
and procedures for the determination of tribal status, 109  the 
limitation of the sovereignty of tribes through legal regimes 
implicating property and political power, and the language used to 
justify these distinctions.110 
In summary, through the encounters of conquest, the idea that 
property would be tied to sovereignty (that the political conquest of 
territory could morph to ownership claims over land and the control 
of people) becomes crystalized.  The idea of the entwinement of 
property and sovereignty itself as well as the racialized hierarchy of 
legitimate land uses has legacies today in common law property.111  
Moreover, conquest itself was strengthened through the associated claims 
to property:  transfers of land to the conquerors served as justification 
for violations of indigenous sovereignty more generally.  The legal 
 
“uncivilized” was not just associated with Native American societies but can be 
understood in the broader context of a distinguishing between “civilized” and 
“uncivilized” nations as per U.S. modes of imperialism.  Purdy 2007, supra note 64, 
at 331. 
 107 Purdy 2007, supra note 64, at 331. 
 108 Purdy 2007, supra note 64, at 331. 
 109 William Wood, Indians, Tribes, and (Federal) Jurisdiction, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 
415 (2016). 
 110  WILLIAMS 2005, supra note 64; ROBERT A. WILLIAMS JR., THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1992). 
 111  This can be observed, for example, in the efforts to zone out racial 
minorities from American suburbs.  See DAVID M. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: 
STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2010); Priya S. 
Gupta, Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal History, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 
187-243 (2015). 
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and political architecture supporting claims of conquerors to that 
land and to exercise some form of rule over people 112  can be 
observed in many encounters around the world, continuing to the 
present day,113 for example in relation to Standing Rock in North 
Dakota in the United States,114 Algonquin land in Canada,115 and 
Juru sacred sites in Australia.116 
This legalization of the taking of land through the 
transformation of the doctrines of ‘occupation’ and ‘use’ has 
powerful implications for the coherency of liberal property theory.  
First, the idea of a hierarchy of “use” at the top of which are superior 
societies who use land for wealth creation continues to endure.  This 
conceptualization of property continues to justify shifting resources 
away from populations, and from there, even territory and self-rule 
and sovereignty.117  Second, the theory of what justified a claim to 
land (superiority of use) was a product of its historical context and 
motivations of certain historical actors.  (More recently, agriculture, 
as a form of the highest cultivation of land would give way below to 
other uses such as industrial manufacturing.) Expressed differently, 
what this example illustrates is that property theory is not 
ahistorical—it was formed in response to particular circumstances.  
The myth of ahistorical property doctrine only furthers its ability to 
 
 112  On the paternalism of colonialism, see DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, 
PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE 
(2000). 
 113 For example, Patrick McAuslan has traced the use of land law in New 
Zealand as ‘a weapon of colonization.’  McAuslan 2015, supra note 39, at 343.  Burger 
and Frymer use American ideas of empire to trace the legal treatment of Native 
American property to the current international IPR regimes on seeds.  Michael 
Burger & Paul Frymer, Property Law and American Empire, 34 U. HAW. L. REV. 471 
(2012).  See also Joseph William Singer, Indian Title: Unraveling the Racial Context of 
Property Rights, or How to Stop Engaging in Conquest, 10 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1 (2017). 
 114 Kyle Whyte, The Dakota Access Pipeline, Environmental Injustice, and U.S. 
Colonialism, 19 RED INK: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDIGENOUS LITERATURE, 
ARTS, & HUMANITIES 154 (2017). 
 115 Ian Austen, Vast Indigenous Land Claims in Canada Encompass Parliament 
Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/12/world/canada/canada-first-nations-algonquin-land-claims.html 
[https://perma.cc/N2SG-2XT3]. 
 116 Ben Smee, Adani Coal Port Faces Possible ‘Stop Order’ After Traditional Owners 
Object, GUARDIAN (July 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2018/jul/05/adani-coal-port-faces-possible-stop-order-after-
traditional-owners-object [https://perma.cc/89T3-XRNX]. 
 117 See MACKLEM, supra note 64. 
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make opaque political decisions around the allocation of land and 
resources. 
Third, these moves worked to entrench a British colonial version 
of common law property, and attempted to foreclose the plurality of 
indigenous conceptions of land claims as well as their ways of 
relating to land.118   Recognizing a more pluralistic conception of 
property would have significant implications for land distribution 
today.  For example, accepting a plurality of conceptions around 
claiming title would force Canadian law to reconcile itself with 
indigenous methods of claiming territory.119  Furthermore, plurality 
also implies something broader—that entire conceptions of the 
relationship between people and land need re-telling.  As Macklem 
notes, “[d]efining occupation by European standards of cultivation 
and notice exclude[d] from the outset legal consideration of the fact 
that many Aboriginal people related and continue to relate to land 
 
 118 See, e.g., Brian Slattery, The Legal Basis of Aboriginal Title, in ABORIGINAL 
TITLE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: DELGAMUUKW V. THE QUEEN (Frank Cassidy ed., 1992); 
KIRSTEN ANKER, DECLARATIONS OF INTERDEPENDENCE: A LEGAL PLURALIST APPROACH 
TO INDIGENOUS RIGHTS (2014) (offering a pluralist conception of law that is dialogical 
and transformative rather than merely inclusive).  See generally Jose Mencio 
Molintas, The Philippine Indigenous Peoples’ Struggle For Land And Life: Challenging 
Legal Texts, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 269 (2004) (discussing conflicts over land in 
the context of the rights of indigenous peoples in the Philippines); Rebecca Tsosie, 
Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property in 
America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291 (2000) (discussing Native American understandings 
and claims to property rights); Richard Overstall, Encountering the Spirit in the Land: 
‘Property’ in a Kinship-Based Legal Order, in DESPOTIC DOMINION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
BRITISH SETTLER SOCIETIES 22-49 (John McLaren, AR Buck & Nancy E Wright eds., 
2005) (discussing Western legal systems’ difficulties in comprehending  indigenous 
Peoples’ understandings of property).  See Paul Nadasdy, “Property” and Aboriginal 
Land Claims in the Canadian Subarctic: Some Theoretical Considerations, 104 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 247 (2002) (discussing how “a particular, possibly erroneous, 
construction of indigenous law became geographically extended and imposed as 
legal authority for a universalized notion of “customary tenure”).  See also Heinz 
Klug, Defining The Property Rights Of Others: Political Power, Indigenous Tenure and 
The Construction Of Customary Land Law, 35 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 119 (1995) 
(discussing the same topic with reference to South Africa). 
 119 See MACKLEM, supra note 64, at 76 explaining how 
“the law of Aboriginal title recognizes that, if they can demonstrate that their 
ancestors exclusively occupied territory at the time Britain asserted sovereignty 
and that they continued to occupy the territory in question, Aboriginal people 
enjoy the right of exclusive use and occupation of such territory for a variety of 
purposes.”  
 See also Bhandar 2011, supra note 58, at 64-74 (examining the development of 
Canadian legal criteria necessary to establish aboriginal title). 
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in ways that defy traditional European understandings of 
productive use and notice.” 120   The discussion around the 
transformation of cities in the Global South in Part III picks up on 
this idea of using land use as a tool to promulgate narrowly 
conceived ideas of modernity at the expense of more pluralistic 
relationships to land and urban space. 
Fourth, as Jedediah Purdy has argued with reference to Johnson, 
this legal treatment of indigenous claims to land effectively 
“produce[d] two bodies of international law:  one governing 
relations among full sovereigns, the other governing relations 
between full sovereigns and imperfect sovereigns.”121  The logic of 
the latter—the laws that govern encounters between full and 
imperfect sovereigns—was applied in Johnson as well as in other 
cases determining the common law status of indigenous claims to 
land.  The treatment of claims to property was foundational to the 
idea that indigenous sovereignty was somehow a lesser form—an 
idea that continues to structure relations between common law 
regimes and indigenous regimes even today.122 
Finally, as explored above, the hierarchy of ‘use’ mutually 
constituted and reinforced ideas around superiority of culture and 
race, which were then deployed to justify exercises of control over 
land and people.  That justification of a racialized hierarchy 
extended far beyond property in land123  and underpinned exercises 
of sovereignty.  It was also foundational to the idea that people of 
certain races could themselves be considered the property of 
others—the foundational concept underpinning the transatlantic 
system of slavery.124 
 
 120 MACKLEM, supra note 64, at 81. 
 121 Purdy 2007, supra note 64, at 341. 
 122 See Singer 1991, supra note 58, at 4 (commenting on the “double standard” 
applied to Native Americans and non-Native Americans).  
 123 See Bhandar 2011, supra note 58, at 69. 
 124 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993) 
(stating the idea that people could be considered property, foundational to systems 
of slavery around the world, deserves its own transnational treatment and is 
unfortunately outside the scope of this Chapter’s focus on land-related concepts of 
property). 
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2.2. From Colonial to Constitutional and Developmental Property 
Regimes 
Colonialism in its various forms was also ingrained  through 
occupation and the exercise of dominion.  Colonial rule over time, 
place, ruler, ruled, can hardly be generalized, nor can the different 
approaches to property that were entrenched through their 
processes.  One cannot overstate the impact of the imposition of 
other systems of property holding, rights, and use over so much of 
the world.  Moreover, the exchange of ideas regarding rights and 
regimes over land, and the formation of ideas through those colonial 
encounters, provide yet another dimension through which the 
perceived past is actually an ongoing moment for property theory.  
This Section will trace one thread of analysis in particular:  the legacy 
of colonial-era land regimes as revealed in the political choices and 
tensions during the writing of new constitutions.125  It will explore 
this phenomenon in India and South Africa before turning in the 
next Section to the legacy of colonial-era legal regimes more 
generally and the extent of that legacy’s impact on economic 
development and investment law and policy still today. 
As postcolonial political scientist and anthropologist Partha 
Chatterjee has noted, the key concern in legal-constitutional 
framework of postcolonial politics is “the question of social 
(including economic) transformation: 
Whatever the form of the transition from colonial rule—
whether a peaceful handover of power or an armed 
liberation war—the new postcolonial regime almost 
everywhere was confronted with the pressing necessity of 
transforming, whether gradually or radically, the inherited 
institutions of colonial society . . .  the extent to which a set 
 
 125  See Upendra Baxi, Postcolonial Legality: A Postscript from India, 45 
VERFASSUNG UND RECHT IN ÜBERSEE/LAW AND POLITICS IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN 
AMERICA 178, 187 (2012) (stating “[a] central problem [of Third World 
Constitutionalism] has been one of redefinition of property relations.  Given the 
diversity of patterns of colonization and national resistance movements, 
postcolonial legality furnishes divergent narratives.”). 
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of precommitted foundational laws should bind the 
transformative acts of the new regime.126 
The decision to continue or to undo colonial-era property 
distribution is key to that transition.  In the Global South during the 
twentieth century, these tensions often came to the surface during 
the deliberation of new constitutions.127  The deep significance of 
who was able to hold land through colonial rule and for what ends 
can be evidenced by the significant debates that took place around 
assigning land rights that perpetuated the status quo or that 
reformed land regimes to be more equitable.  At the heart of this 
tension was an underlying motivation that in order to present a 
newly formed government to the world as a stable protector of a 
liberal rights regime, certain and secure rights to property were 
perceived as a must. 
Two brief examples follow—India in the late 1940s and South 
Africa in the 1990s.  What is important are the questions raised in 
the respective assemblies and each example’s connection to the 
other.  These debates and transformations did not happen in an 
ahistorical or acontextual vacuum, and each nation’s connection to 
dominant ways of conceptualizing property was made evident in 
the manner this topic was debated, adapted, and emergent. 
In India, for example, for several years after gaining 
independence of 1947, a significant debate regarding property rights 
clauses took place during the writing of the Indian Constitution in 
the Constituent Assembly.128   Assembly members struggled with 
whether to preserve the status quo of property holdings—and the 
accompanying social order—or to attempt a massive societal 
transformation.  The debate raised many foundational questions for 
the new government.  It had to decide whether the new legal regime 
 
 126  Partha Chatterjee, Introduction: Postcolonial Legalism, 34 COMP. STUDIES 
SOUTH ASIA, AFRICA & MIDDLE EAST, 224, 224-25 (2014). 
 127  See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Should Property Be Constitutionalized? A 
Relational And Comparative Approach, in PROPERTY LAW ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 
21ST CENTURY 417 (G. E. Van Maanen & A. J. van der Walt eds., 1996) (discussing 
the relationship of customary land use systems and European legal property 
frameworks in developing countries); ALEXANDER 2006, supra note 9. 
 128  See CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES OF INDIA, 
http://cadindia.clpr.org.in/[https://perma.cc/L6KL-TXK7].  See generally Gupta 
2011, supra note 75; GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A 
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE (2003). 
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would signal its commitment to strong property rights in the 
classical liberal sense (by deeming the right to property a 
fundamental constitutional right, and thereby preserving current 
landholdings) or whether it would decisively try to rectify the 
unequal distribution of land entrenched during colonial times by 
supporting various state programs to redistribute land holdings.  
The former—strong property rights—would continue the colonial-
era regime of land acquisition found in the Land Acquisition Act of 
1894 that the British had imposed. 129   The latter—land 
redistribution—would forge a bold new path for the newly 
independent nation but it would also be a move away from the 
dominant common law property regimes (found in England and 
America).  This choice echoed larger tensions faced by the newly 
independent former colonies between, in Upendra Baxi’s words, 
“the liberal bourgeois” and “revolutionary socialist” forms of 
constitutionalism.130  These two discourses manifest themselves in 
property clauses as:  “[T]he socialist postcolonial form (SPF) and the 
capitalist postcolonial form (CPF).  If SPF celebrates the denial of 
ownership in the means of production (private property), CPF 
venerates rights in private property.” 131  That difference in the 
conception of private property has crucial implications for the class 
structure and contours of citizenship: 
Whereas in CPF political representation in liberal 
constitutionalism is a function of class domination, in the 
SPF “state” such representation stands collectivized though 
the Party always claiming to represent “workers,” 
“peasants,” and “masses”. [sic]  If SPF imagines adjudication 
as a way of markedly pedagogic role in the construction of 
the new socialist human person; CPF insists on a relatively 
autonomous liberal self of its citizens (rational choice actors) 
pursuing their own ends of private interests (freedoms to 
define their life projects).132  
 
 129 The origins of the Act can be traced back to at least 1824.  See Gupta 2011, 
supra note 75. 
 130 Baxi, supra note 125, at 182. 
 131 Baxi, supra note 125, at 182. 
 132 Baxi, supra note 125, at 182. 
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Accompanying India’s choice regarding its vision of citizenship 
was also a significant question of federalism:  how much power 
would be delegated to or left with states to decide the property 
question?  And, underlying that question was a further query about 
the nature of Indian federalist government:  did Indian states have 
residual or delegated power to decide such fundamental questions? 
Throughout the Constituent Assembly debates in India, 
numerous other constitutions were examined and drawn from—for 
example, constitutions from Ireland, Yugoslavia, the United States, 
and the U.S.S.R.133  Members of the Assembly drew from a variety 
of governmental forms to debate how power should be distributed 
horizontally between branches of government and vertically 
between the state and federal levels.  During these debates, 
Assembly Members referenced slavery in America, Marxist theory, 
Proudhon and many other examples of property thought that they 
felt India should heed (or, in the case of slavery, avoid) at that 
time.134  Further, some members were very concerned that including 
a strong property rights regime would become a “Magna Carta for 
the capitalists”135 and that already-existing property holders would 
continue to disproportionately hold valuable resources.  It was 
believed that this entrenchment would make the Assembly’s goal of 
moving towards a “classless society”136 even more difficult. 
While the drafters eventually included a fundamental right to 
property that recognized that private property could be acquired by 
the government through law for a public purpose and with 
compensation (similar to other common law constitutions), the issue 
was far from settled.  The ensuing battle between land reform and 
entrenched status quo property rights moved back and forth 
between the Supreme Court and Parliament through a series of cases 
and legislative acts. 137   At the heart of this debate was the 
 
 133 See generally CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES OF INDIA, Book No. 11 Doc. 
160 ¶ 32 (Nov. 19, 1949) (speech by Damodar Swarup Seth), 
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/25415/ [https://perma.cc/G55N-HX4V]. 
 134 See generally id.   
 135  Id.  
 136  This is a reoccurring theme in Constituent Assembly Debates. See 
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY DEBATES OF INDIA, Book No. 9 Doc. 137 ¶¶ 55-60 (Sept. 10, 
1949) (speech by Damodar Swarup Seth), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/797053/ 
[https://perma.cc/7W22-KHNY]. 
 137 See Gupta 2011, supra note 75.  
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distribution of power between the judicial and legislative branches, 
as well as between the federal and state governments.  Through 
these cases, the boundaries of judicial review, legislative power to 
amend the Constitution, and the ongoing question of states’ 
prerogative to enact land reforms were fought over, shifted, and 
eventually settled upon. 
In 1978, the Indian Parliament took the right to property out of 
the “Fundamental Rights” section of the Constitution and 
redrafted it as a weaker provision which would allow for state-
level land reform.138  While that amendment did allow some land 
reform acts to be implemented, since India’s transformation 
toward economic liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
the absence of a protected fundamental right to property has 
enabled the government to appropriate small land holdings in the 
name of ‘economic development’ and to redistribute them towards 
private industry and mass agriculture,139 A debate over the these 
effects continues still today: 
The postcolonial quest for equity in property relations 
continues, though beset by the inheritance of colonial 
inequities aggravated by malgovernance practices . . . The 
spread of foreign direct investment and multinational capital 
(while posing a different order of challenges to social 
activism and human rights movements) also presents a 
relatively bleak future for agrarian reforms.  The voracious 
appetite of multinationals devours prime agricultural lands, 
forests, and environment (that provide the necessary 
infrastructure for their profit and power).  Postcolonial 
constitutional texts could not have anticipated the context of 
globalization; the task of interpretation has to contend with 
the fact that constitutions become merely the “local” 
particular that has to adjust somehow to the “universal” in 
the global.140 
As Baxi’s account reveals, the mal-distributive effects of the 
common law property regime that was put in place continues, not 
 
 138 See Gupta 2011, supra note 75. 
 139  But see The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, No. 30 of 2013, India Code (2013).  
 140 Baxi, supra note 125, at 189. 
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only through domestic means, but also through global, 
transnational flows of resources, actors, and property thought. 
In South Africa in the mid-1990s, the writing of the new post-
Apartheid Constitution also raised significant questions around the 
issue of entrenched property versus redistribution.141  While these 
questions in some ways mirrored those faced by India—for 
example, the existence of legal regimes that enshrined a vastly 
inequitable distribution of landholdings—in other ways, these 
questions were different, particularly because South Africa needed 
to grapple with racial inequality more explicitly enshrined in their 
original law.  That history of racial discrimination was over a 
century old by the time apartheid ended and was well-entrenched 
in the law and in unequal property distribution.142  When the time 
came for writing a new constitution, a strongly protective property 
rights regime would have maintained the status quo of racial 
inequality not only in land but economically and socially as well.  As 
South African property law scholar André van der Walt explains, 
[g]iven the central role that apartheid land-use and housing 
policies played in the institutionalisation of race-based 
inequality, property law specialists and policy makers 
recognised that the large-scale political and social changes 
that inevitably had to accompany democratisation would 
have to include significant reforms of land use policy and of 
property law in general.143 
The issue of redistributing property to those who had previously 
been excluded from securing title was crucial to the promise of truly 
dismantling apartheid.  At the same time, the establishment of 
secure property rights in a new constitution was seen as a key aspect 
in the reform of the political and societal stability.  The echoes of the 
 
 141 See A.J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY IN THE MARGINS (2009); ALEXANDER 2006, 
supra note 9; HEINZ KLUG, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 55 (2010) [hereinafter KLUG 2010]; Matthew Chaskalson, The Property 
Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution, 10 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 131 (1994); Matthew 
Chaskalson, Stumbling Towards Section 28: Negotiations Over The Protection Of 
Property Rights In The Interim Constitution, 11 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 222 (1995). 
 142 See generally JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL 
ORDER (1978) (discussing the history of racial discrimination in South African law); 
MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE 1902-1936: FEAR, 
FAVOUR AND PREJUDICE (2001). 
 143 See A.J. VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTION 1 (2012). 
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post-colonial constitutional process in India in the 1940s in the South 
African experience post-apartheid in the 1990s are noteworthy.  
According to van der Walt, the Indian struggle between the courts 
and parliament was a cautionary tale for South Africa.  It 
highlighted ongoing societal tension between those with access to 
land and those without; drafters in South Africa sought to avoid the 
kind of entanglement India had experienced.144   After significant 
debate,145 the South African Constitution was drafted to include a 
strong right to property qualified by a sizeable provision detailing 
what kinds of ‘use’ were acceptable as “public use.”146  Moreover, 
this provision did not stand on its own.  Other provisions regarding 
social, cultural and economic rights, including housing, were 
included and provided more concrete structural support to the ideal 
of moving from apartheid to democracy.147 
The issues of reform versus entrenchment, change versus status 
quo, and concentration versus equity arose in many postcolonial 
and post-conflict societies, each with its own history of who had 
been able to hold property, and each with its own conception of 
what kind of society and division of resources it might have as an 
independent state.  In many of these places, multiple property 
regimes were at work simultaneously—indigenous law, colonial 
law and its legacies, comparative law, and foreign claims to land and 
resources—each with their own property languages, concepts, and 
values.  How property regimes would be designed in the aftermath 
of these postcolonial or post-conflict moments required a fierce 
examination of the fundamental notions of statehood and 
sovereignty.  Simultaneously, that design would also send signals to 
other countries and societies as to the nature of law in the newly 
 
 144 Id. at 4. 
 145 KLUG 2010, supra note 141, at 55. 
 146 Id. at 55-58 (discussing in Article 25 how there were some who advocated 
for land redistribution to be enshrined in the Constitution in a way that would have 
left out a requirement for “public use” entirely). 
 147 KLUG 2010, supra note 141, at 132-46 (discussing in Article 26, on the right 
to housing, of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution, that land 
distribution continues to be inequitable, a circumstance that a property clause more 
explicitly crafted to deal with racial inequality might have alleviated); Heinz Klug, 
Hybrid(ity) Rules: Creating Local Law in a Globalized World, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: 
THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL ORTHODOXY 
(Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
654 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:3 
   
 
independent state—signals regarding political and economic 
legitimacy.148 
As the primary institution through which the Global North 
encountered the Global South transitioned from colonialism to 
economic development,149 international agencies and transnational 
economic actors began to exercise increasing influence on property 
regime design.  In particular, the International Monetary Fund 
(“IMF”) and the World Bank attached conditions to their loans and 
projects (conditionality) that mandated the establishment of certain 
forms of property regimes.150  This continued into the 1980s and 
1990s and into the new millennium as the emphasis on development 
evolved into a focus on the rule of law and various forms of investor 
protection.  Through the 1980s and 1990s, the international financial 
institutions (“IFIs”) promulgated the empowerment of private 
capital—and foreign capital in particular—as the way forward for 
development through the Washington Consensus. 151   The 
Washington Consensus was a set of free trade and capital flow 
oriented policy programs that came to be powerfully orthodox and 
implemented in many places.  They included a number of legal 
reforms that were meant to make investors feel secure—including 
ensuring their property rights, contract enforcement, and other 
supportive legal architecture. 152   That a key dimension of the 
Washington Consensus was that this protection of property rights 
would have profound effects on IMF and World Bank conditionality 
 
 148 This was true, even late in the 20th century, in central and eastern Europe 
as those countries negotiated to become part of the European Union (EU).  There as 
well, the lure of entrenching a liberal, individualized property rights regime 
remained strong. 
 149 See GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO 
GLOBAL FAITH (Patrick Camiller trans., 2014); SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONIZING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF 
UNIVERSALITY (2011). 
 150 See World Bank, Land Reform (May 1975). 
 151 See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN 
AMERICAN READJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED (John Williamson ed., 1989); 
World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (May 
1997). 
 152  Williamson, supra note 151; See Priya S. Gupta, From Statesmen to 
Technocrats to Financiers: Development Agents in the Third World, in BANDUNG, GLOBAL 
HISTORY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: CRITICAL PASTS AND PENDING FUTURES (Luis 
Eslava, Michael Fakhri, & Vasuki Nesiah eds., 2017). 
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for the decades to come, as resources continue to be allocated in this 
direction.153 
2.3. The Protection of Foreign Investment through Property Regimes 
The protection of property rights for foreign investors has a long 
history, of which IFI policy is a relatively recent chapter.154  At least 
since the 17th and 18th century activities of the Dutch East India 
Company, have states pushed for property rights recognition 
outside of their borders.155  That tension between the interests of 
“capital-exporting states in developing external norms to protect 
foreign investment through international law” and those of “capital-
importing states in assert[ing] total domestic control of incoming 
foreign investment” 156  played out initially in state-to-state 
negotiation and treaties.  Through the centuries, the more powerful 
interests of capital-exporters left their mark through the formation 
of customary international law and norms with a strong inclination 
towards investor protection, which continues to manifest itself in 
recent times and in new fora. 
The growth of investment regimes, in particular with regard to 
the protection of foreign investors’ rights to property, represents 
another powerful genealogy of property law evolution with a 
profoundly transnational reach.  The investment narrative of 
 
 153  See Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons, in WORLD 
BANK PUBLICATIONS, 3, 19, 63 (Stefan Koeberle et al. eds., 2005), 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-
1114615847489/Conditionalityrevisedpublication.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVS5-
HWNN] (reviewing that conditionality in 2005, and recognizing that in the 1990s, 
a new era of conditionality had been ushered in by donors, who “sought to improve 
the protection of private property rights and create a conducive environment for 
private sector development.”  As a result, the share of policy-based lending shifted 
significantly towards public-sector reforms, which included the protection of 
property rights.  They note that this was particularly true for “poor-performing 
countries”).  See also JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002). 
 154 See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE 
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1985); KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF 
CAPITAL (2013); NOEL MAURER, THE EMPIRE TRAP: THE RISE AND FALL OF U.S. 
INTERVENTION TO PROTECT AMERICAN PROPERTY OVERSEAS, 1893–2013 (2013). 
 155 MILES, supra note 154. 
 156 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 31. 
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property brings into sharper relief the conflictual sites at which 
property is at the center of capital flows, licensing, and disputes over 
title and prior use of land, as well as disputes over long-held 
practices in relation to land.157  At the heart of such struggles we are 
repeatedly confronted with starkly asymmetric dynamics between 
local stakeholders’ and multi-national corporations’ claims to 
property.  As such conflicts erupt and unfold around a widely 
diverse range of vested interests including resource extraction, land 
use, and indigenous practices, the roots of these conflicts are 
inextricably linked to the deep history and geography of property’s 
transnational formation. 
As M. Sornarajah’s seminal account of foreign investment law 
examines, an international legal regime around investment was first 
formed between the United States and Latin America through the 
United States’ efforts to protect the investments of its nationals.158  
Over time, and with decolonization in Africa and Asia, investor 
protection became more internationalized. 159   This 
internationalization brought to the fore issues around the 
universalization of the Calvo Doctrine (Argentine jurist Carlos 
Calvo’s idea that foreigners should not enjoy more rights than 
citizens in Latin American countries, and should, therefore, be 
subject to local jurisdiction for disputes involving their investments 
in those countries 160  and permanent control over natural 
resources161).162  Later phases of international investment law were 
 
 157 See MACKLEM, supra note 64 (Chapter 2 in particular describes the ongoing 
destruction of Aboriginal culture in Canada); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF 
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2003) 
(noting the dominant account of property title, international capital, and 
development). 
 158 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 32-35. 
 159 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 31-42.  
 160  See Patrick Juillard, Calvo Doctrine/Calvo Caluse, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007), https://opil.ouplaw.com/
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e689?prd=EPIL 
[https://perma.cc/NPQ6-NE9M]. 
 161 See SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 31-42; Pahuja, supra note 6; Georges Abi-
Saab, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Economic Activities, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 597 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 
1991). 
 162 Id. at 35 (noting through the NIEO and the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States). 
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marked by the Washington Consensus and a neoliberal ascendancy 
of the norm of investor protection.163 
During and after the 1990s, the idea of investor protection has 
become of the utmost importance—not just in the conditionalities of 
the IFIs referred to above, but also in regional and bilateral trade and 
investment treaties.164  This shift is manifested in:  a change of actors 
involved in these disputes from state-state to investor-state; a 
change of the forum of dispute settlement from those of international 
legal institutions to those of arbitration; 165  and a change of the 
substantive law applied in that forum.  It is important to highlight 
that the change in law increasingly prioritized foreign investors at 
the expense of other interests, including in regimes governing the 
expropriation of the property of foreign investors. 166   While 
customary international law had permitted states to expropriate 
property for a ‘public purpose’ with full compensation, as long as 
there existed due process and an “absence of discrimination 
between foreign investors and different home states,” 167  these 
regimes have given way to providing hospitable environments for 
foreign investment and allowed for the development of a powerful 
policy orthodoxy. 168   With the rise of this orthodoxy, trade and 
 
 163 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 43-68 (detailing a discussion on resistance—
on the reality of whether international investment agreements do in fact attract 
foreign direct investment, and if such agreements are worth the trade-off of state 
sovereignty); FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (Olivier De Schutter et al. 
eds., 2013). 
 164 See Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The 
Contours of the International System of Investor Protection, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON.  
600, 608-09 (2005) [hereinafter Van Harten 2005] (noting the reasons for the 
proliferation); JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING 
INTERNATIONALIINVESTMENT (2011) (examining the increasingly fragmented treaty 
regimes governing international investment). 
 165 As Adkins and Grewal point out, however, investment arbitration for the 
protection of foreign investors has a long history, used at least since the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries to protect colonial investments, before its manifestation as 
a “tool of economic development” to provide foreign capital with the “special 
protection” that was believed necessary “in order [for it] to flow into areas subject 
to ongoing economic and political uncertainty.”  Cory Adkins & David Singh 
Grewal, Democracy and Legitimacy in Investor-State Arbitration, 126 YALE L.J. F. 65, 66 
(2016). 
 166 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 191-245. 
 167 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 191. 
 168 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 191-245. 
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investment agreements have become more specific regarding 
investor protection, including for example, with the inclusion of 
provisions specifying arbitration as the chosen forum for disputes 
and the empowering of investors to bring direct actions in those 
arbitral fora. 
The increasing reliance on the new type of forum has 
transformed how the law is applied.  Arbitrators, who had “been 
schooled in international commercial arbitration where property 
and contract were sacrosanct,” emphasize the priority of investor 
protection over other considerations.169  In effect, as Gus Van Harten 
argues, “states have turned private arbitration into a method of 
governance based on generalized investor-state arbitration,” in that 
this system of investor protection relies on the state to “establish 
institutions that in turn regulate the use of public authority at the 
domestic level.”170  But, “the system of investor protection [also] 
relies on the coercive authority of states, within their territory, to 
seize the assets of other states and make those assets available to 
investors.”171  Van Harten summarizes the issue of delegation of 
governance prerogative of states: 
[t]he system of investor protection . . .  reflects an evolution 
of that model in the context of an international political 
economy in which the interests of multinational enterprises 
are prioritized in regulatory decision-making . . . . The system 
of investor protection is a model of transnational governance that 
relies on state authority in order to authorize and enforce investor 
claims while affording broad decision-making power to private 
individuals and organisations.  The exercise of state power is made 
 
 169 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 199.  The 2000 ICSID award in Santa Elena v. 
Costa Rica is a notable example.  See Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. 
v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award (2000).  For a 
critical review of the prioritization of investor compensation over environmental 
interests, see MILES, supra note 154, at 166-67, and Philippe Sands, Searching for 
Balance: Concluding Remarks, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 198 (2002).  For an insightful 
discussion of how the NAFTA Article 1105 principle of “minimum standard of 
treatment” was used in a NAFTA arbitral forum to justify circumventing Canada’s 
effort to protect the environment and interests of indigenous peoples in Nova Scotia 
in Clayton v. Canada, see Adkins & Grewal, supra note 165.  See generally KYLA 
TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING 
FOREIGN INVESTORS AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC POLICY (2009). 
 170 Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 602, 610. 
 171 Id. at 610 (drawing from (Stone Sweet, 2002)). 
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subject to private discretion exercised both by private investors and 
private arbitrators.172 
The systemic nature of the just-described investor protection 
regime can be seen in the broader context of global capital flows and 
financial regulation.  Investment protection is but one key element 
in an overarching shift of national and international rulemaking that 
prioritizes the removal of regulatory obstacles to the advantage of 
an increasingly mobile and volatile flow of investments in and out 
of national and regional markets. 
Investor protection through arbitration has also another 
dimension symptomatic of the shift in governance.  It is now 
standard for trade and investment treaties to include the mechanism 
of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) through which 
corporations and investors can seek redress from countries directly 
for infringements on their property rights.  Van Harten has referred 
to this proliferation of “investor state arbitration as the backbone of 
an emergent international system of investor protection.”173   The 
system has moved from one where states represented investor 
interests in negotiation and dispute resolution, to one of direct 
representation, but only for certain non-state actors.  Refugees, 
migrants and those who would claim human rights violations do 
not have this kind of standing.174  The recent cases brought by the 
tobacco giant Philip Morris regarding intellectual property rights 
illustrate the controversy around the use of these mechanisms. 
In 2010, Philip Morris International (“PMI”) filed an action 
seeking $25M in damages as well as injunctive relief against 
Uruguay in the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) alleging that the country’s introduction of new 
health regulations stipulating that tobacco packaging include 
pictures and warnings about the dangers of smoking. 175   PMI 
claimed that these regulations, as well as others, restricted sales of 
more than one brand of their cigarettes and were treaty violations in 
that they would impair their investment and amounted to an 
 
 172 Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 610-11 (emphasis added). 
 173 See Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 602.  See also VAN HARTEN 2008, 
supra note 7. 
 174 Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 602-03. 
 175 Philip Morris v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration 
(2010). 
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expropriation.176  PMI filed similar actions in Australia and Norway, 
and threatened them in Togo, Namibia and the Solomon Islands.177 
PMI was claiming, in effect, was a new kind of “regulatory 
taking” on an international scale that would limit a country’s 
prerogative to issue regulations that might interfere with PMI’s 
potential future profits.  After a much-publicized arbitral battle, the 
tribunal for the Uruguay decision in 2016 found in favor of Uruguay.  
The arbitrators found no expropriation, and PMI was ordered to pay 
a portion of Uruguay’s attorney fees.178 
These and other ISDS actions reveal the vulnerabilities of both 
wealthy and less wealthy countries under the current model of ISDS.  
By enacting a measure apparently in the health interests of their 
people respective populations, these states unwittingly exposed 
themselves to a drawn-out arbitral battle and millions of dollars in 
legal fees.  In PMI’s case, PMI lost against Australia, as well as 
Uruguay and Norway, but all claims exposed these countries to 
expensive legal battles.  Moreover, other actions, for example 
 
 176 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos 
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 Award (July 8, 
2016) at ¶ 9-12. 
 177 See Philip Morris Asia Ltd v. The Commonwealth of Austl., UNCITRAL, 
PCA Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction (2015); Philip Morris Norway AS v. 
the Norwegian State, represented by the Ministry of Health and Care Serv., EFTA 
Court, Case E-16/10, Judgment (Sept. 2011); Juliet Samuel, The Defeat of Big Tobacco 
on Plain Packaging is Good for Democracy, TELEGRAPH (May 19, 2016), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/the-defeat-of-big-tobacco-on-
plain-packaging-is-good-for-democra/ [https://perma.cc/LB5J-BKHL].  British 
American Tobacco and other tobacco companies have also brought or threatened 
this kind of legal action against Kenya, Uganda, Namibia, Togo, Gabon, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Burkina Faso.  See Sarah Boseley, Threats, Bullying, 
Lawsuits: Tobacco Industry’s Dirty War For The African Market, GUARDIAN (July 17, 
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/12/big-tobacco-dirty-
war-africa-market [https://perma.cc/R2DC-H5SG]. 
 178 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos 
S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7 Award (July 8, 
2016) at ¶ 590. 
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Vattenfall v. Germany, Ethyl v. Canada, and Clayton v. Canada,179 reveal 
the exposure of wealthy nations to these kinds of battles as well.180 
These actions reiterate perennial questions regarding 
sovereignty, regulation, and international law, which are now 
making their reappearance under the heading of “property.”  By 
effectively subjecting national regulation to direct scrutiny and, to 
some extent, even control by investors and corporations, investment 
arbitration has exposed stark disparities between countries’ ability 
to exercise sovereign control over welfare policies and other 
redistributive regulations.  While many countries have 
commitments under the WTO and other institutions and 
agreements to avoid certain kinds of regulation, this action exposed 
the power differentials between a multi-national corporation and a 
relatively small country.  This is further illustrated when one 
compares Uruguay’s GDP of $56B with PMI’s $80B revenue/year.181  
In other words, one might think of Uruguay and other similarly-
situated countries as operating their domestic regulatory regimes 
under the shadow of ISDS.182 
 
 179 See Adkins & Grewal, supra note 165, for a discussion of Clayton v. Canada, 
a NAFTA arbitral suit against Canada for their determination a quarry in Nova 
Scotia could not go forward in light of the harm to the environmental and 
indigenous rights. 
 180 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 196-99, citing Ethyl v. Canada, 38 ILM 708 
(1999) and Vattenfall v. Germany, ICSID, Case No. ARB/09/6, Award (Mar. 11, 
2011).  In the Canadian case, it was a “statement of a minister announcing a future 
intention regarding a measure to controlling the production of a potentially 
carcinogenic substance” that was seized upon by the foreign investor.  See 
SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 196.  See also Adkins & Grewal, supra note 165, at 66 
(discussing specific instances and the context of how “developed democracies are 
now being targeted under a system of arbitration they had designed for use 
elsewhere”). 
 181  Leo Sun, Why Is Philip Morris International Inc. Suing These Countries?, 
MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.fool.com/investing/
general/2015/11/23/why-is-philip-morris-international-inc-suing-these.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/DKM2-MGBE].  
 182  See Cecilia Olivet & Alberto Villareal, Who Really Won the Legal Battle 
Between Philip Morris and Uruguay?, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jul/28/who-really-
won-legal-battle-philip-morris-uruguay-cigarette-adverts 
[https://perma.cc/2H7L-S92N] (“The arbitration panel’s decision to hear the 
[Uruguay] case put a brake on the adoption of similar tobacco control measures in 
Costa Rica, Paraguay and New Zealand, among others.”).  See, e.g., TIENHAARA, 
supra note 169. 
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The actions also highlight the de facto asymmetry between states 
and multi-national corporations.  They expose the potential 
windfalls to corporations from trade and investment treaties that 
include such ISDS measures.  These treaties are agreed to by states, 
and while not always negotiated by companies, seem to operate to 
their benefit.  Under current public international law, corporations 
lack personality, enabling them to avoid “accountability for wrongs 
[they] may commit during [their] operations.” 183   In short, as 
Sornarajah has framed it, the multinational corporation has “rights 
but no responsibilities” and “wields considerable power to effect 
change in both domestic and international law,” in part through 
their use of “low-order sources of international law in constructing 
rules favourable” to them. 184 
Finally, in seeking injunctive relief, the PMI actions also 
implicate state sovereignty in that such relief would give private 
actors “unprecedented authority over states’ traditional lawmaking 
powers by allowing them [private actors] to move to invalidate 
laws” passed in the public interest to accord with the state’s own 
interest.185  And yet, these private actors remain largely invisible as 
subjects of international law, in part because, as Cutler has argued, 
they have actively pushed for legal structures that “disembed 
commercial law and practice from the ’public‘ sphere and re-embed 
it in the ’private‘ sphere, free from democratic and social control.”186 
Stepping back from PMI, one can discern two insights.  First, 
focusing specifically on the transnational, border-crossing 
dimension of property, intellectual property appears to be the 
primary field to contain both the principles to frame and justify, and 
the doctrinal-regulatory instruments to facilitate, the global 
diffusion of related norms.  Examining the varied histories of 
international and transnational intellectual property regimes 187 
leads to further inquiries into the evolving political economies to 
which the regulatory regimes stand in relation, and with which they 
 
 183 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 21. 
 184 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 21.  See also Johns 1994, supra note 51. 
 185 See VAN HARTEN 2008, supra note 7; see also Adkins & Grewal, supra note 
165. 
 186 CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 13. 
 187 See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); ROBERT P. MERGES & SEAGULL HAIYAN SONG, 
TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: TEXT AND CASES (2018). 
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stand in mutually constitutive relationships.  With this examination 
of the political complexities, the neat and linear story of a liberal 
extension of the individualistic 188  right to property into the 
immaterial realm is exposed as both overly-simplistic and to some 
degree inaccurate.189 
Second, one can see how over time, the nature of the protection 
of investors’ property has shifted in at least three ways.  First, the 
idea of what is protected—what constitutes an “investment”—has 
shifted towards intangible property involving “rights of control 
through shareholdings rather than ownership”190 and “goodwill or 
intellectual property or holding companies and short-term capital 
flows.” 191   Second, what that investment is protected from has 
expanded as well, and now includes the potential for protection 
against environmental, health, price, export-related, or industrial 
regulations that might decrease the future profits of corporations.  It 
also includes protection against “administrative control 
mechanisms” such as licensing provisions.192  Finally, the remedies 
offered have expanded as well.  As “compulsory arbitration lead[s] 
to a damages award rather than more conventional public law 
remedies,”193 this shift now allows petitioners in this case to seek 
both injunctive relief and pecuniary damages. 
It is also worth noting the entrance of new laws shaped by 
encounters across jurisdictional borders.  Here what is property and 
the nature of protective regimes around it have been transformed 
not only because of the transnational encounters between investors 
and states, but also between those actors and localities through the 
 
 188 See C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 
(1962). 
 189 For an intriguing history of narratives of imperialism, colonization and 
exploitation in the assertion of intellectual property rights, see SHIVA, supra note 32; 
see also Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-
so-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 IND. J. 
GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 2 (1998). 
 190  SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 199-200 (explaining the difficulty in 
evaluating the nature of protection for shareholders). 
 191 Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 604. 
 192 SORNARAJAH, supra note 7, at 200. 
 193 Van Harten 2005, supra note 164, at 604.  For the seminal treatment of the 
intersection of tort and property with regard to remedies, see Guido Calabresi and 
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of 
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
664 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:3 
   
 
multiple forms of resistance with which communities have 
engaged.194 
Moreover, the effects of this new regime are far-reaching in 
scope.  For example, in contrast to the strengthening of property 
rights for some actors, multi-pronged strategies to attract foreign 
investors have also led to land grabs and the displacement of many 
communities across many countries in Africa. 195   In relation to 
changes of the law to accommodate investors in mining in Mali, but 
with insight that applies elsewhere as well, Hatcher argues that the 
government has shifted from “owner/operator” to regulator to 
“facilitator of foreign investment.” 196   The nature of the control 
ceded here is wider than just with regard to the new mining code, 
but rather “redefines” a new role of the state.197  In Mali and in other 
places, while this legal reform did spur gold mining and public 
revenue, the rights of village residents were left behind.  The land 
that villagers had occupied has been deliveredto the foreign mining 
companies,198 food has become scarcer and more expensive,199 and 
resources have not been re-distributed.200  Despite being the third 
largest producer of gold in Africa, “one in five Malians live in 
extreme poverty.”201  Implicit here is the state’s valuing of putting 
 
 194  See LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN 
LEGALITY (Boaventura De Sousa Santos & César Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005); 
RAJAGOPAL 2003, supra note 65. 
 195 For example, in 1991 and 1999, with support by the World Bank, Mali 
“revised mining legislation to make the country more attractive to foreign 
companies.” COTULA, supra note 5, at 89.  This included numerous tax revisions, 
streamlining of licensing, and also guaranteeing security of mineral title.  Pascale 
Hatcher, Mali: Rewriting The Mining Code Or Redefining The Role Of The State, in 
REGULATING MINING IN AFRICA: FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? 39, 43-46 (Bonnie Campbell ed. 
2004). 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 COTULA, supra note 5. 
 199  Oxfam in Mali, OXFAM (2012), https://www.oxfam.org.uk/what-we-
do/countries-we-work-in/mali. [https://perma.cc/H2BD-GMPB]. 
 200 OXFAM, HIDDEN TREASURE: IN SEARCH OF MALI’S GOLD-MINING REVENUES 
(2007), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/hidden-treasure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PCL6-ZM9P]. 
 201  For Many Malians, Especially Those Uprooted by Conflict, Life is Fragile, 
RELIEFWEB (Oct. 16, 2013), https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/many-malians-
especially-those-uprooted-conflict-life-fragile [https://perma.cc/RRN6-M62T].  
See also OXFAM, MALI: A NEW DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT? (2013), https://oi-files-d8-
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land to work towards its apparent highest use, which is no longer 
subsidence agriculture in this example, but mining.  Moreover, 
across land grabs, one can observe the continuation of the narrative 
around “empty land” as a way to invite and entice investors. 
3. METHODOLOGY: SEEING PROPERTY THROUGH TRANSNATIONAL 
LAW 
From the relationship of conquest and imperialism to the more 
recent methods of attracting foreign capital, the material influence 
of transnational actors and ideas on the form and content of 
property regimes has been powerful.  Different conceptions of 
property have been generated by the encounters described above.  
A transnational approach to studying property turns our attention 
not just to the actors, but also to the larger ideas regarding the nature 
of “law” itself that crossed borders, took hold, and was adapted and 
implemented. 
What follows is a discussion of four lenses through which a 
transnational analysis of property may be approached:  the 
“diffusion of law,” the plurality of law and its constituent norms, 
postcolonial “everyday lived experiences” of urban property, and 
law’s proliferation in terms of norm creation and norm 
implementation beyond the state.  This list is not exhaustive, but 
rather, is meant to be suggestive of ways of analyzing how property 
operates in particular geographies and eras, how dominant forms of 
property regimes came to be and the implications for their 
transplantation, and how the exercises of sovereignty that are 
entwined with property can be revealed and scrutinized. 
 
prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/file_attachments/bn-mali-new-
development-contract-150513-en_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZV7-X2YN].  As of 
2008, IMF still pushed for better property rights for investors.  INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, MALI: SELECTED ISSUES: IMF COUNTRY REPORT, NO. 08/286. (Aug. 2008), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08286.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/34UZ-VUNF]. 
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3.1. The Diffusion of Transnational Property 
Appreciating the complex ways in which particular ideas in 
property travelled and took hold in various geographies202 means 
not only seeing connections between property regimes that came 
into contact with each other, but also how global (and ongoing) 
moments of conquest, colonialism, development, and investment 
processes shape conceptions of what constitutes property and who 
gets to hold it.  Diffusion worked differently in each of the phases 
above.  While in the discussion of conquest and colonialism, the acts 
of states in the development of jurisprudence was observed; in the 
turn to investment law, the power of private actors to make law in 
closed, private arbitral settings was observed.  Against this 
backdrop, the question arises of how the connections between 
property regimes—the travels and comingling of resources and 
capital, people, and ideas that change how property is lived—can be 
appreciated without reducing heterogeneous regimes into one 
universal story of orthodox thinking in property.  How should one 
examine, consider, and compare, similarities, differences, influences 
and mutual constitution without telling a story of inevitable 
convergence towards Western conceptions of property rights?  In 
other words, does focusing on the “flow of capital” and the rising 
power of private actors open up to risk of telling one universal story 
of capital and property—that of imposition of Global North acting 
on the Global South through colonies and spaces of development 
and investment? 
Postcolonial scholar Dipesh Chakrabarty unpacks the hidden 
universalism in narratives of global capital, 
No historical form of capital, however global its reach, can 
ever be a universal . . . The universal, in that case, can only 
exist as a place holder, its place always usurped by a 
historical particular seeking to present itself as the 
universal . . . . 
Histories of capital, in that sense, cannot escape the politics 
of the diverse ways of being human.  Capital brings into 
 
 202 See, e.g., William Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 507 (2006); DAVID A. WESTBROOK, NAVIGATORS OF THE CONTEMPORARY: 
WHY ETHNOGRAPHY MATTERS (2009). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss3/2
2020] Globalizing Property 667 
   
 
every history some of the universal themes of the European 
Enlightenment, but on inspection the universal turns out to 
be an empty placeholder whose unstable outlines become 
barely visible only when a proxy, a particular, usurps its 
position in a gesture of pretension and domination.203 
In short, then, the “globalization of capital is not the same as 
capital’s universalization.”—meaning that the existence of 
globalization is not an indication that the “universal and necessary 
logic of capital,” per Marx has been realized.204  Rather, “singular 
and unique histories” continue to “interrupt” and “defer” capital’s 
“self-realization” and in doing so, serve as “grounds for claiming 
historical difference.”205 
Similarly, liberal conceptions of property regimes may look 
universal, monolithic, neutral, 206  or coherent 207  or are often 
presented as such. 208   But, in fact, what is revealed upon an 
examination of the processes of property regime formation is that 
that image of monolithic property is a myth.  Laws and norms have 
changed with time and place, have been adapted to fit the 
circumstances in which they were meant to serve.  Often, they have 
served to perpetuate the interests of the stronger class of parties.  
This recognition of historical contingency—of choice in how property 
regimes are conceptualized—also reveals the double role 209  that 
property can play, both enfranchising and disenfranchising, 
simultaneously. 
How then can one decenter that myth of universality and 
coherence—and inevitability—in an account of the seemingly 
apparent diffusion of property law across the globe?  Focusing the 
 
 203 CHAKRABARTY, supra note 112, at 70. 
 204 CHAKRABARTY, supra note 112, at 71.  
 205 CHAKRABARTY, supra note 112, at xvii, 71. 
 206 See CUTLER 2003, supra note 48, at 14. 
 207 See FITZMAURICE, supra note 82 (attributing the expansion of certain forms 
of common law to “cohering power of ideology,” which was needed to exercise 
force (and for our purposes, property claims) over long distances). 
 208 For example, in the purported “best practices” in development orthodoxy 
or investor protection practices explored above. 
 209 On law’s double role, see Robert A. Kagan, Bryant Garth, & Austin Sarat, 
Introductory Essay: Facilitating and Domesticating Change: Democracy, Capitalism, and 
Law’s Double Role in the 20th Century, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY (Austin 
Sarat, Bryant Garth, & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2002). 
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analysis on the historical contingencies of specific property doctrines 
and their legal technologies might enable the beginning of 
deconstructing the mythology around strong universal property 
rights.  Such technologies include the use of (i) formality, title, and 
land records to attract capital from another jurisdiction, 210  (ii) 
individual ownership and privatization in the name of progress,211 
and (iii) land use and zoning to attract or maintain wealth—and 
even the status of certain national212  or racial groups213 —within 
jurisdictions.  Each of these technologies have traveled well outside 
their original spheres of influence and served many different 
interests in their journeys.214  Seeing property this way forces the 
reconsideration of technologies that look technical and neutral as 
technologies that have in fact perpetuated exclusion.  It helps people 
see how many property concepts emerged in certain moments to 
protect then-present constellations of power and that were then 
entrenched through time by codification into law and 
transplantation elsewhere, with their history left behind. 
Here, tracing the flows of capital, people, and ideas does not 
mean a turn of gaze from domestic contexts into a white abstract 
space somehow detached from the nation-state.  In recognizing the 
multi-sited origins and re-shapings of property concepts, it is also 
important to acknowledge the interplay between multiple domestic 
contexts.  This interplay lies at the heart of transnational law 
formation and involves shifting assemblages of actors and 
institutions, events, ideas, norms, and processes.  As such, 
transnational property law regimes are constituted as well by the 
flows of capital and people between them, from which regulatory 
claims are made and begin to take shape.  Recognizing the dialectic 
between global and local, and the interactions between multiple 
“local sites” can reveal much about how law changes, and how it 
 
 210 See Gupta 2014, supra note 21. 
 211 See discussion of the taking of indigenous land in supra Part I. 
 212 See McAuslan 2015, supra note 39. 
 213 Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994). 
 214 For example, while it was shown above that property regimes designed to 
attract foreign capital can be problematic enough, it should also be noted that the 
formalization of property ownership through land titling programs has also been 
used to both entrench gendered inequality of ownership, as well as to try to 
alleviate it. 
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reflects underlying societal values.  From there, one might see not 
just how materials things—capital, resources—flow among 
geographies, but also how ideas and ways of life (and therefore legal 
norms) are transformed through transnational travels, encounters, 
and conflicts. 
3.2. Plural Property 
In recognizing the complexity of the diffusion of law globally, 
engaging with the plurality of regimes and the multiplicity of 
sources, as well as scales of legal relations, becomes crucial.  In 
proceeding in the project of developing a conceptual framework for 
transnational property law, one enters into the realm where legal 
doctrine not only meets and engages the sociology of law and legal 
anthropology, but where one, in fact, discover that doctrine and 
principle do not exist in complete isolation from the way in which 
social sciences describe and scrutinize legal forms of ordering.  After 
investigating property’s transnational birth and evolution in old and 
new conflictual encounters, this Article can now draw on social 
sciences to help understand the nature, the consistency, and the 
dynamics of the transnational property law regimes that it has been 
tracing.  That this undertaking is echoed in concurring scholarly 
efforts to revive and to reconceptualize theories of governance,215 
legal pluralism,216 and legal geography,217 is not surprising. 
William Twining captures this endeavor as follows: 
In law, it is especially important to distinguish between 
different geographical levels of human relations and of legal 
ordering of these relations—from outer space to the very 
 
 215 THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Rodney 
Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker eds., 2002). 
 216 See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243 
(2009); Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1155 (2006); 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization and 
Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle In India, 18 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L L. 345 (2005). 
 217  THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE (Nicholas 
Blomley, David Delaney, & Richard T. Ford eds., 2001); THE EXPANDING SPACES OF 
LAW: A TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY (Irus Braverman, Nicholas Blomley, David 
Delaney, & Alexandre Kedar eds. 2014). 
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local, including intermediate levels, such as regions, 
empires, diasporas, alliances, and other multinational 
entities and groupings.  These levels are not neatly nested in 
concentric circles nor in hierarchies, nor are they static nor 
clearly defined.  A reasonably inclusive cosmopolitan 
discipline of law needs to encompass all levels of legal 
ordering, relations between these levels, and all important 
forms of law including supra-state (e.g. international, 
regional) and non-state law (e.g. religious law, transnational 
law, chthonic law i.e. tradition/custom and various forms of 
‘soft law’”).218 
“[I]f one is concerned with legal ordering at all levels from 
the very local to the intergalactic, including non-state local, 
regional, transnational, and diasporic then clearly 
borrowing, blending, and other forms of interaction can take 
place at all levels and between different levels; interaction 
can be vertical, horizontal, diagonal, or involve more 
complex pathways . . . .219 
Thinking about this concept of law against the examples 
presented in Part II, it becomes even clearer how property regimes 
are plural and spatial in nature.  A fitting conceptual framework 
exists in the form of legal pluralism, which the legal anthropologist 
Sally Engle Merry defines  as “a situation in which two or more legal 
systems coexist in the same social field.”220  Postcolonial theory, with 
its recognition of the multiplicity of legal regimes simultaneously 
governing, offers an understanding of plurality that engages with 
the complex entanglement of legal systems—not only are they 
operating simultaneously but they also are mutually constitutive.  
Postcolonial theorists also offer understandings of how law and 
norms emanate from non-state actors through a multiplicity of 
processes.  In that vein, the legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos conceives of “the phenomenological counterpart of legal 
pluralism” through the introduction of a concept of “interlegality,” 
defined as “the conception of different legal spaces superimposed, 
 
 218  William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL 
PLURALISM 11 (2004). 
 219 Id. at 13 [internal citations omitted, emphasis added.] 
 220 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 (1988) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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interpenetrated, and mixed in our minds as much as in our actions, 
in occasions of qualitative leaps or sweeping crises in our life 
trajectories as well as in the dull routine of eventless everyday 
life.” 221   By employing the concept of interlegality, one sees, for 
example, not only the production of law through colonial 
encounters, but also are able to carry forward that encounter as an 
ongoing moment of law creation, diffusion,222 and transformation in 
our legal analysis. 
From there, a world view comes into view—both 
geographically, and across time—not a universalistic conception of 
one legal regime but rather, a global or transnational legal pluralistic 
sense of the larger geographic and societal frames that are relevant 
to legal analysis.  Property regimes, as noted in the opening of this 
Article, are not just based ‘locally’ or in one nation-state, as 
evidenced by the overlapping spheres of pluralistic legal systems 
and jurisdiction.  This implies that instead of studying legal regimes 
or even legal pluralism within a state context, one should appreciate 
a global vision of multiple legal systems interacting and forming 
laws and norms through those encounters and from images of 
governance coming from both “below”223 as well as “above”.224   
As the lived experiences of people around property, in 
particular, demonstrate, the multiple regimes that govern may be 
‘official’ or ‘unofficial’, formal or informal, written or not written—
coming from the state or not.  Indeed, for legal pluralists, even 
“[s]tate law itself is multiple.”225  As Martha-Marie Kleinhans and 
Roderick A. Macdonald explain, this “multiplicity is both internal 
 
 221 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern 
Conception of Law, 14 J.L. & SOC’Y 279, 297-98 (1987). 
 222 Note that from this view, that diffusion would be multi-directional and 
nonlinear.  See EVE DARIAN-SMITH & PHILIP C. MCCARTY, THE GLOBAL TURN: 
THEORIES, RESEARCH DESIGNS, AND METHODS FOR GLOBAL STUDIES (2017) (discussing 
methods of global research and advocating a holistic approach to understanding 
contemporary global issues). 
 223 Sousa Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 194; RAJAGOPAL 2003, supra 
note 65. 
 224  See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The 
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.15 (2005) (arguing 
that contemporary pluralist imaginations are based on a limited view of the law 
and proposing an alternative image of law). 
 225  Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Rod A. Macdonald, What is a Critical Legal 
Pluralism?, 12 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 25, 31 (1997). 
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and external.”226  Internally, it can be found in  “unitary systems that 
referentially incorporate local custom and commercial practice as 
part of the official legal regime in explicitly federal systems” as well 
as “where diverse administrative agencies compete with each other 
and with different judicial bodies to regulate conduct[.]” 227  
Externally, multiplicity arises “in every situation involving what 
jurists conventionally label “choice of law” in the conflicts of laws,” 
operating through “multiple bodies of law, with multiple 
institutional reflections and multiple sources of legitimacy.”228   
In the examples above, that multiplicity comes not just from 
interactions of conflicting property law regimes, but also from the 
intersection of property, international law, finance, immigration, 
and regimes of other sovereigns.229  Each of these features are found 
in multiple forms within the nation-state, between nation-states, and 
crucially, from the actions and norms held by non-state corporate, 
civil society, and local and global entities and actors.  One can see 
through the examples of investment law and property rights, how, 
while the boundaries between practice areas may be breaking down, 
there is also increased fragmentation 230  and the rise of highly 
specialized regulatory constellations.231   
3.3. Everyday Lives of Urban Property in the Global South 
This leads to the third implication of this globalized orientation:  
the opening of theoretical space in which to rethink property 
regimes in terms of their origins and evolution, their “life” and 
 
 226 Id. at 31. 
 227 Id. at 31. 
 228 Id. at 31-32 (internal citations omitted).  On objections to the move away 
from state law and fears for the Rule of Law, see id. at 32-34. 
 229 JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION (2010) (discussing the 
nature and sources of Canadian law and determining that the Canada’s constitution 
is incomplete without further inclusion and acceptance of Indigenous legal 
traditions); John Borrows, Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 167 (2005) (recognizing Canada’s need to more effectively recognize 
Indigenous legal traditions). 
 230 On the fragmentation of public international law, see Martti Koskenniemi 
& Päivi Leino, Fragmentation of international law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. 
INT’L. L. 553 (2002). 
 231 See Zumbansen 2012, supra note 24, at 191. 
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functional dimensions “in action.” 232   Moving from historical 
examples of encounters forward, this Section sets out to locate the 
sites of conflicts over property in the City. 
Cities—where property claims to scarce resources play out with 
a particularly high pitch and where the investment flows discussed 
above are landing unevenly around the world—are fascinating and 
intriguing regulatory and epistemic spaces in that regard, 233 
particularly through the analytical lenses offered by urban 
sociologists studying cities in the Global South or “from the 
South.”234   
This literature can be seen as part of broader methodological and 
normative efforts to re-think an array of disciplinary and theoretical 
frameworks and “from the South.”235  As Ananya Roy has argued, 
First World conceptions of cities are so inadequate for Third World 
cities that it is not that they need reconfiguring, but that the episteme 
itself should be informed by the experiences of the Third World, as 
 
 232 Roscoe Pound, Law in Action and Law in Books, 44 AM. L. REV. 12-36 (1910) 
(discussing the divergence between legal theory and the practical application of 
black-letter law). 
 233 As Coll Thrush points out in his immensely readable and informed account 
of indigenous life in London, cities are also places that are seen as having little 
Indigenous “presence and even less significance,” and so have been used to 
reinforce historicist and racist binaries of modern/not modern.  See COLL THRUSH, 
INDIGENOUS LONDON: NATIVE TRAVELERS AT THE HEART OF EMPIRE (Yale U. Press, 
2016).  In the past several decades, the “Global City” paradigm has come to 
prominence.  The Global City, often associated with Saskia Sassen, refers to “a set 
of global command and control centers that are connected in transnationally 
networked hierarchies of economic, demographic and sociocultural relationships.” 
SASKIA SASSEN, GLOBAL CITY 4 (Princeton U. Press 2d ed. 1991).  That paradigm has 
been invaluable in demonstrating how these transformations, regulation, 
information, capital, and production processes have to be understood as global 
processes subject to multi-layered regulatory regimes and with uneven spatialized 
landings.  Moreover, studying the City against this political economic background 
further reveals the state’s growing reliance on private authority as it seeks to create 
an ever more amenable playing field for global investors, while significantly 
weakening democratic forms of accountability on local, national and global levels.  
On the idea of “private authority,” see A. Claire Cutler et al., The Contours and 
Significance of Private Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. (A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, & Tony Porter eds., 
1999). 
 234 See, e.g., Jennifer Robinson & Ananya Roy, Debate on Global Urbanisms and 
the Nature of Urban Theory, 40 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RES. 181 (2016) (discussing the 
decentralization and reframing of the concept of the urban space). 
 235 Jean L. Comaroff & John Comaroff, Theory from the South: Or, How Euro-
America is Evolving Toward Africa, 22 ANTHROPOLOGICAL F. 113 (2012). 
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well as the First.236  In these accounts, the Global South is not just as 
a place that was acted upon by colonial and other Global North 
forces, but rather as a diverse constellation of locations that generate 
theoretical categories.  In that sense, this literature both affirms and 
critiques the concept of the Global City by revealing the diversity of 
modes of city participation in the global economy.237 
From the project of building an understanding of transnational 
property, this re-orientation of research could mean engaging with 
a plurality of property regimes as they operate in people’s everyday 
lives, particularly those living in cities in Global South.  This 
approach could help reveal the flows of resources, power 
imbalances, and perpetuation of colonial logics, 238  all of which 
demonstrate how property has been conceived and how 
transnational encounters have been instrumental in that conception.  
What follows are several brief illustrations of the categories and 
frameworks that might be re-thought in relation to property.   
Perhaps not entirely surprising given the massive development 
projects of the previous several decades, many of these urban 
sociological engagements encourage new thinking around the 
concept of ‘infrastructure’.  For example, Swati Chattopadhyay, 
writing about Indian cities with particular reference to Calcutta, 
reconceptualizes infrastructure to include popular uses of city spaces 
(such as cricket and religious ceremonies).  These uses are re-read in 
her account as political expressions.239  In a comparable vein, but 
with focus on African cities, Ambreena Manji explores what might 
constitute an effective ‘right to the city’ in the context of the uneven 
 
 236 Ananya Roy, Who’s Afraid of Postcolonial Theory?, 40 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L 
RES. 200, 202 (2016) (arguing that Eurocentrism in discussions of the urban space 
precludes multiple concepts of “the urban” and other understandings of political 
economy).  See also Ananya Roy, The 21st-Century Metropolis: New Geographies of 
Theory. 43 REG’L STUD. 819 (2009) (discussing Eurocentrism in dominant theories 
about global city-regions and the  consequential exclusion of “metropolitan 
modernities”). 
 237 For a seminal critique of the concept of Global Cities and an alternative 
conception of the place of cities in global economic structures, see JENNIFER 
ROBINSON, ORDINARY CITIES: BETWEEN MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT (Routledge 
2006). 
 238 See LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick eds., 
1999). 
 239  See SWATI CHATTOPADHYAY, UNLEARNING THE CITY: INFRASTRUCTURE IN A 
NEW OPTICAL FIELD (U. of Minn. Press 2012) (questioning the traditional concept of 
the urban space and advocating for the need for a new urban vocabulary). 
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benefits and inconveniences of highway construction in Nairobi.240  
AbdouMaliq Simone writes of the remaking of infrastructure and 
space through mixed uses of land—in his words, “improvised 
livelihoods in mixed-up districts”—and interdependence and 
isolation in Jakarta. 241   With reference to Johannesburg, he 
reconceptualizes infrastructure as people—infrastructure in this 
case being the flexible, creative, and resourceful economic 
collaborations among otherwise marginalized residents that, like 
more the more traditional sort of infrastructure, serve as “a platform 
providing for and reproducing life in the city.”242 
These projects raise numerous questions for the 
responsiveness243 of property regimes—those that are established in 
these jurisdictions as well as those on the ‘outside’ that interact with 
them.  Decisions around who gets to have a say in the built 
environment—in the spaces that order daily life for societies—
involve often procedural and technical local governmental forms of 
governance.  Decisions around who should have access to that built 
environment—in short, for whom it is built—find their outcomes' 
codification in property regimes.  Decisions around who will have 
access to that built environment—around how title and rights to use 
built environments will be allocated—may involve seemingly 
mundane applications of formal property law, but this Article has 
shown how the colonial and conquest legacies valuing a hierarchy 
of uses of space remain powerfully imprinted in current property 
thought. 
Infrastructural growth—material and re-imagined—is of course 
just one dimension of the massive transformations undergone by 
cities in the Global South in the past few decades.  Other dimensions 
 
 240 See Ambreena Manji, Bulldozers, Homes and Highways: Nairobi and the Right 
to the City 42 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 206 (2015).  
 241 See ABDOUMALIQ SIMONE, CITY LIFE FROM JAKARTA TO DAKAR: MOVEMENTS AT 
THE CROSSROADS (Routledge 2010) (challenging the traditional analyses of urban life 
by focusing on cities in Africa and South East Asia, notably Chapter four). 
 242  AbdouMaliq Simone, People As Infrastructure: Intersecting Fragments In 
Johannesburg, 16 PUB. CULTURE 407, 407-08 (2004). 
 243  PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: 
TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (Transaction Publishers 1978) (discussing jurisprudential 
issues in a social science project).  On reflexivity, see Gunther Teubner, Substantive 
and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 L. & SOC. REV. 239 (1983); Peter Zumbansen, 
Law After the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism, and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive 
Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769 (2008). 
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include the rise of middle classes244 , their notable heterogeneity, 
massive urbanization,245 and the ensuing displacement and forced 
evictions.246  Each of these dimensions brings with them new ways 
of life that are often structured in some way by property regimes 
and transactions—whether through consumerism, new household 
configurations with new homes to match, 247  or new patterns of 
labour and transport as well as access to resources 248  and daily 
security of life and livelihoods.  These transformations have driven 
the reconceptualization of cities and the idea of the urban, 
 
 244 Homi Kharas, The Emerging Middle Class in Developing Countries, OECD 
DEVELOPMENT CENTRE WORKING PAPERS (2010), https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/5kmmp8lncrns-en.pdf?expires=1579799888&id=
id&accname=guest&checksum=530556FC4878DC7DD2E91241E7C97C73 
[https://perma.cc/2AX4-PME2] (examining the establishment of the middle class 
in developing countries, specifically, the role of the middle  class in current 
economic thought); Moses Naim, The Uprising of the Global Middle Class, ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 25, 2017) (discussing the economic impact of the rise of the middle class in 
developing countries); On the global middle class, situated from Morocco, see S. 
COHEN, SEARCHING FOR A DIFFERENT FUTURE: THE RISE OF A GLOBAL MIDDLE CLASS IN 
MOROCCO. (2004).  Regarding Jakarta, see AbdouMaliq Simone, Cities Of 
Uncertainty: Jakarta, The Urban Majority, And Inventive Political Technologies, 30 
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 243 (2013).  Regarding Latin America, see Francisco H. G. 
Ferreira, Julian Messina, Jamele Rigolini, Luis-Felipe Lopez-Calva, Maria Ana 
Lugo, & Renos Vakis, Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin American Middle 
Class, WORLD BANK PUBLICATIONS (2012), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/
1c5f/6dc583aef0d314312790c4ff00c22140d86b.pdf?_ga=2.256296139.1528751496.15
79800024-1657322843.1579800024 [https://perma.cc/WH4N-DE4Q]; LATIN 
AMERICA’S EMERGING MIDDLE CLASSES: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES (J. Dayton-Johnson 
ed., 2015).  On the uncertainty associated with these transformations, again see 
Moses Naim, The Uprising of the Global Middle Class, ATLANTIC (Aug. 25, 2017); see 
also MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS (2006). 
 245 See generally THE NEW BLACKWELL COMPANION TO THE CITY (Gary Bridge & 
Sophie Watson eds., Wiley-Blackwell 2011) (discussing the impact of increased 
urbanization); Neil Brenner & Christian Schmid, Planetary Urbanization, in URBAN 
CONSTELLATIONS (M. Gandy ed., 2012) (arguing that within the context of 
urbanisation, political-economic spaces should not be treated as discrete and 
distinct types of settlement). 
 246 See GAUTAM BHAN, IN THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST: EVICTIONS, CITIZENSHIP, AND 
INEQUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY DELHI (U. of Ga. Press 2016) (discussing planned 
illegalities, spatial illegality and evictions and the politics of governance n 
contemporary Delhi).  
 247 For example, in India, the rise of nuclear family households. 
 248 See NIKHIL ANAND, HYDRAULIC CITY: WATER AND THE INFRASTRUCTURES OF 
CITIZENSHIP IN MUMBAI (2017); see also SIMONE 2010, supra note 241 (discussing a 
resourceful daily life in the face of “carbon-driven exigencies of infrastructural 
transformations,” opening up possibilities for the remaking of societal relationships 
and politics in egalitarian ways). 
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particularly in the Global South, as “megacities,” “world”/“world-
class,” 249  “spectacular,” 250  “ordinary,” 251  “entangled,” 252 
“bourgeois,”253 “hydraulic,”254 “slumdog,”255 “yet to come,”256 and 
as sites of “pirate modernity,”257 to name a few. 
Who—or what—is governing these societal, economic, and 
political transformations and their implications for the use of city 
space?  As the accounts in Part II and the discussion of diffusion and 
plurality above attempted to demonstrate, sites of governance—and 
therefore sites of agency—are diffuse and overlapping.  Such sites 
can often be found in a constellation of state, sub-state, and non-state 
actors from communities to professional groups to civil society 
groups.  It has also been shown how the governance of given fields 
of law is dependent on ever-evolving webs of various fields of law 
and regulation.  In property’s case, for example, investment, 
development lending, immigration, and finance operate 
simultaneously on different scales of jurisdiction—local, national, 
transnational, with ongoing translation, adaptation, and fusion 
between them.258 
 
 249 See WORLDING CITIES: ASIAN EXPERIMENTS AND THE ART OF BEING GLOBAL 
(Ananya Roy & Aihwa Ong eds., 2011). 
 250 See IPSITA CHATTERJEE, SPECTACULAR CITIES: RELIGION, LANDSCAPE, AND THE 
DIALECTICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2016). 
 251 See Robinson & Roy 2016, supra note 234. 
 252 See SANJAY SRIVASTAVA, ENTANGLED URBANISM: SLUM, GATED COMMUNITY, 
AND SHOPPING MALL IN DELHI AND GURGAON (2015). 
 253 See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, Are Indian Cities Becoming Bourgeois At Last?, in 
THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR POLITICS IN MOST OF THE 
WORLD 131 (2004). 
 254 See ANAND, supra note 248. 
 255 See Ananya Roy, Slumdog Cities: Rethinking Subaltern Urbanism, 35 INT’L J. 
URB. & REG’L RES. 223, 225 (2011). 
 256 See ABDOUMALIQ SIMONE, FOR THE CITY YET TO COME: CHANGING AFRICAN 
LIFE IN FOUR CITIES (2004). 
 257 See RAVI SUNDARAM, PIRATE MODERNITY: DELHI’S MEDIA URBANISM (2010). 
 258 For a gripping journalistic narrative of the self-governance of a slum in 
Bombay in the context of urbanization, construction, and increased official security 
state, see KATHERINE BOO, BEHIND THE BEAUTIFUL FOREVERS: LIFE, DEATH, AND HOPE 
IN A MUMBAI UNDERCITY (photo. reprt. 2014) (2012).  For a rich account of the 
transformations of the idea of the local—in this case Bogota—within constellations 
of international law and development policy, see LUIS ESLAVA, LOCAL SPACE, 
GLOBAL LIFE: THE EVERYDAY OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
(2015). 
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More specifically, then, how has the governance of urban 
property in cities in the Global South transformed in this context of 
globalization?  Sketching a picture of sites of governance of space 
and of who has access to which city spaces and for what purposes is 
necessarily complex.  For example, in writing about Calcutta, Partha 
Chatterjee tells of the changing nature of neighborhood public 
spaces and institutions—parks, tea shops, markets and much 
more—established by the wealthy and middle classes in the 1950s, 
and often very diverse in terms of class, religion, language and 
ethnicity. 259   Poorer residents lived in close quarters with the 
wealthy, sharing patron-client relationships, often working in 
industrial factories owned by the wealthy. 260   Democracy and 
development projects of the 1970s and 80s brought a number of 
accommodations to alleviate urban poverty, including improved 
access to sanitation, education, and healthcare for poorer 
residents. 261   However, with post-industrialization and the 
increasing disengagement of the middle classes from urban politics, 
these neighborhoods have become much more segregated—by class 
as well as religion/language/ethnicity—and much more 
disinclined to support the lives and livelihoods of various classes 
and interests.262  These changes are reflected in property and land-
related law, as wealthy and middle classes increasingly bring 
actions to move poor residents away from what they perceive as 
their living spaces and resources. 263   The poor, while having 
increased access to some forms of social welfare at times, had never 
been treated as full citizens with respect to their access to property 
or neighborhood space, as it evidently would have threatened “the 
entire structure of legally held property.”264  And so, even while the 
poor sometimes gained access to some facilities and benefits 
through ongoing negotiations with separate government agencies 
and on a case-by-case basis, such access was not regularized across 
 
 259 See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 133. 
 260 See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 132. 
 261 See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 135. 
 262 See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 139-142. 
 263 See Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253; see also Gupta 2014, supra note 21. 
 264 Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 137.  For a discussion around cloudy land 
title in India with regard to all socio-economic classes, see Priya S. Gupta, Ending 
Finders, Keepers: The Use of Title Insurance to Alleviate Uncertainty in Land Holdings in 
India, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 63 (2010). 
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populations, so as to prevent “jeopardizing the overall structure of 
legality and property.”265  That lack of recognition of the poor as 
rights-bearing citizens has enabled the judiciary more recently to 
sanction the clearance of slums and residents who live on pavement 
and in encampments with little alternative accommodation.266 
This account further highlights the need for a relevant account 
of law to go beyond purported formality to appreciate the degree of 
informality and plurality that governs the “regime” in question.  It 
is here again that an understanding of “property law” requires one 
to draw on socio-legal accounts and on ethnographies of “everyday 
lives” to effectively understand societal ordering with, through and 
around property.  With the help of more differentiated, 
interdisciplinary tools it becomes possible to gain an understanding 
of who actually has access to ownership, who in reality gets to hold 
title and makes decisions regarding land within households,267 and 
what the true circumstances are around gender access to ownership 
and use.  Based on a differentiated, ethnographically-based critique, 
it might be a better position to assess what kinds of uses are 
prioritized in different, specialized, and increasingly fragmented 
regulatory areas.  Finally, it might allow a clearer picture of the 
underlying demographics, and which populations have security of 
use of city space and, crucially, how this changes over time.  In an 
effort to better understand the shifting constellations of actors who 
exercise agency around property, this would also prompt a look at 
policy and legal entrepreneurs who shift ownership patterns and 
access to resources.  Examples of such entrepreneurs might include 
title aggregators who work to assemble large plots of land ready for 
re-development, immigration lawyers who work to secure visas in 
exchange for investment from abroad, or others who fulfill similar 
societal positions. 
The account also highlights the need to engage with multiple 
fields and regulatory areas at the same time, and against the 
background of larger political-economic and societal 
 
 265 Chatterjee 2004, supra note 253, at 137. 
 266 See Gupta 2014, supra note 21. 
 267  On the legal nature of the household, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE 
HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH (2008).  For a critical account 
situated during the Greek debt crisis of 2010, see Philomila Tsoukala, Household 
Regulation and European Integration: The Family Portrait of a Crisis, 63 AM. J. COMP. L. 
747 (2015). 
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transformations.  Evolving priorities and values involving property 
are, at the very least, found within the following regulatory areas:  
foreign investment (including who can invest in real estate and in 
what forms real estate can be built; tax and tax credits; local 
governance and regulations), zoning, sanitation, utilities (including 
the politics of which residents get access to reliable water and 
electricity), the use of law to treat homeless populations as 
“nuisance”268  or “illegal”269 , who gets to serve on local councils, 
property sales and transactions (the process of assigning and 
registering title, mortgage and insurance), inheritance, and the 
nature of constitutional rights involving property and the politics 
around their exercise. 
What does this account do to liberal property theory and its 
reliance on formality, records, delineated and individual ownership 
and separation of uses by space?  This account presents its own 
theory, grounded in its own experiences.  It also offers a powerful 
critique to the often-assumed universality of common law property.  
In short, and in reference to the historical moments and property 
doctrines presented in Part II, it puts pressure on the reality of such 
concepts as formality and title; just exercises of land appropriation 
and eminent domain; the implicit hierarchy in the concept of ‘use’; 
individual ownership and rights; and the exercise of sovereignty 
over space and residents; as well as entitlements that accompany 
invasion and occupation.  It also raises broader questions around 
how law comes into being, who exercises agency, whose interests 
are represented and why and how property is actually used and 
understood. 
 
 268 See generally D. ASHER GHERTNER, RULE BY AESTHETICS: WORLD-CLASS CITY 
MAKING IN DELHI (2015) (discussing the treatment—and non-treatment—of 
homeless populations by government officials in formal and informal actions). 
 269 See Usha Ramanathan, Illegality and The Urban Poor, 41 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 
3193 (2006) (tracking the shift of the judiciary in classifying the urban poor’s 
housing crisis as an issue of legality as opposed to one of fundamental rights).  For 
a powerful account of the “criminalization of poverty” in the United States, see 
Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643 
(2009). 
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3.4. Actors and Encounters (and even Law) Beyond the State 
[T]he state has lost its exclusive role in the global sphere.  It 
has not become unimportant—some states have arguably 
increased their power and their importance—but it has lost 
its independence.  States have become, to use concept that 
Keohane and Nye popularized, interdependent; their role 
depends on and in turn influences that of other states, and 
much of their activity now happens in cooperation with 
other states . . . [I]t matters also that states have become 
disaggregated, as Anne-Marie Slaughter has 
demonstrated—rather than viewing the state as a uniform 
actor we should look at the actions of its different agencies, 
which are sometimes in conflict with each other.  Moreover, 
we must learn to look not just at states as lawmakers but also 
to focus on the significant lawmaking by non-state actors—
arbitrators, institutions (so-called rule formulating agencies), 
multinational corporations, ethnic communities, and so 
on.270 
The three themes that Ralf Michaels highlights resonate with a 
transnational approach to property:  interdependent states, 
disaggregation, and lawmaking by non-state actors.  First, while the 
state continues to exist and play a significant role in property 
regimes, a transnational approach to property would not be 
centered around national or international law that emanates from 
only the state and would recognize the influence of other states and 
localities in the formation of property regimes.  Second, a 
disaggregated approach trains scholars to see the multiple levels of 
co-existing jurisdiction over land—local (which might be rural or 
urban or both), state, national, as well as executive, legislative, and 
judicial.  More provocatively, appreciating the state as 
disaggregated also opens the possibility to see the conflicts of values 
in different fields of law that intersect with land—environmental, 
land use, human rights for example—as they play out through 
agency wars, judicial opinions, and conflicting social movements. 
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COMP. L. 352, 355 (2016). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2020
682 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:3 
   
 
This lens also turns our attention to actors and processes for 
lawmaking beyond the state, recognizing that the state has a huge 
part, but acknowledging that law is also created through encounters 
between various actors.  Sometimes these encounters are between 
states, but may also include individuals, colonizers, development 
consultants, arbitrators, investors, and corporations to name a few.  
Property regimes are a result of myriad encounters, failed and 
successful claims, relationships, evolutions, and transactions.  This 
approach attempts to shift our focus from the already-existing 
property regimes to the genealogies of how such regimes came 
about, in particular how transnational encounters beyond the state 
shaped the formation of such regimes.  In addition to reflecting how 
property is lived in the everyday sense, this broader perspective of 
property in transnational context also aligns with the reality of how 
norms are produced today through privatization, deregulation, and 
other forms of the ceding of public authority to private actors.271  In 
this age of globalization and a financialized form of capitalism,272 it 
seems even more essential to use legal analytic tools that reflect that 
reality. 
In that sense, looking beyond the state opens our frame much 
wider than the relative neatness of (relatively formal) lawmaking by 
nonstate actors.  It also brings an engagement with what might be 
considered “non-legal” 273 —with the informal, the messy, the 
undefined, the slow and nonlinear processes of formalization, the 
extralegal, and the everyday discussed in the Section above.  In other 
words, looking at the operations of property regimes beyond the 
state also underscores the necessity of engaging with lived 
experiences of property in trying to appreciate how regimes are 
established, operated, transformed, and which purposes they serve 
(e.g. how regimes actually govern property).  From this perspective, 
it becomes fairly obvious that one’s analytical frame must embrace 
sociological, anthropological, political economic, and other accounts 
of property-related circumstances.  (Without that expansion, how 
 
 271 See Hall & Biersteker, supra note 215; Cutler, supra note 233. 
 272 See GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY: MONEY, POWER, AND 
THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES (1994);  see also GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: 
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 273 See Peter Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 141, 145 (2010). 
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could one appreciate the legacy of the stretching of terra nullius on 
indigenous peoples and even in other circumstances around the 
world, or the significance of state sovereignty and democratic 
tensions in the system of investment-related arbitration as dispute 
resolution?)  Despite the methodological shift in research 274  and 
even judging275 of property regimes toward an interdisciplinary and 
ethnographic approach, orthodox property thought seems stuck in 
the transplantation of universal ideals for regime design across time 
and geography. 
CONCLUSION: WHAT IS PROPERTY AND WHO GETS TO HAVE IT 
This Article has attempted to show how common law property 
thought is a product of transnational encounters, and to offer several 
interdisciplinary ways of analyzing property law in transnational 
context.  This orientation towards transnational examination would 
more squarely address how certain entrenched concepts in property 
law are used in different geographies and times in ways that 
perpetuate inequality through normalization of the status quo 
distributions of wealth.  Several such concepts are discussed herein. 
First, even, what is considered property?276  How did certain things 
come to be considered property and in more than one jurisdiction, 
no less?  What does it mean for something to be ‘property’ in a legal 
sense?  That is, how is the definition of property, in part, a reflection 
of encounters and ensuing legal regimes?  Both the object of 
property and also the rights that attach can be appreciated more 
fully in transnational context. 
Second, the justifications around what a property regime should 
promote (underlying the question of ‘why do societies have 
 
 274 See DARIAN-SMITH & MCCARTY, supra note 222; Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels 
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property?’)277 have played out in various circumstances where ‘uses’ 
of property were prioritized, as we saw above with conquest and 
colonialism.  Justifications have varied over time and place—wealth 
production, agriculture, development, economic growth, 
marketability—and tell a powerful story of shifting priorities and 
underlying values in societies, as well as the circulation of those 
values and how they can be embedded in property regimes. 
Closely related to these justifications for allocation of property 
and success of claims based on use are the concepts such as progress278 
and modernity279 that have driven the development of certain aspects 
of property regimes.  These concepts have different meanings and 
associations in different times and places.  They are highly 
contingent upon their circumstances and they do different work in 
different places, and yet, some patterns emerge in how they are used 
to drive property regimes. 
Once one attends to the patterns in the purposes that property 
serve—patterns that exist transnationally—it is possible to then 
draw connections between segments of populations in very 
different geographies.  For example, the extensive government 
support in the United States for the building of suburbia post-War 
with resources for construction, real estate lending, as well as 
infrastructure such as roads and utilities were part of a larger 
narrative of progress and development that was meant to bring 
along certain kinds of citizens.  This might be considered in 
connection with the rhetorical support for the middle class as 
progress for society with more recent discourse in India that 
celebrates the urban middle class as modern citizens.  Both 
circumstances involve vast governmental resources that structure 
and support private industry and consumerism within powerful 
rhetorical values of national progress and entrance into world-stage 
of politics and geopolitical power, and that draw in citizens as 
dutiful consumers who through their (literal) buy-in, help move 
their country forward.  The point here is not to universalize, but to 
 
 277 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
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see transnational flows of ideas and influence and to understand the 
pull of progress and modernity,280 in particular. 
Finally, and again, the question of ‘who gets to have it?’ is affected 
by the jurisdictional border crossings of these notions.  Ideas of use 
and modernity are closely related to who is a legitimate holder and 
user of property and to which lifestyles should be given space to 
operate.  This much is clear from the discussion of indigenous 
people and their uses of land in the United States, Canada, and 
Australia, casting such populations and uses as not “modern” 
enough to justify their occupancy.  It is also present in the vast webs 
of regulations that both explicitly and implicitly excluded black 
people and other racial minorities from homeownership in 
American suburbia when it was built281 and through and after the 
Financial Crisis of 2008.282  Much of the power of these situations 
resides in what is cast as ‘normal’ and as ‘desirable’.  Slow shifts in 
what kinds of uses—and what kinds of occupants—are legitimate 
are not articulated as changes in law or precedent, but rather as 
obvious justifications not in need of further explanation.  Superiority 
of race as well as caste, religion, and class, depending on the 
circumstance, gets embedded in judicial and societal discourse and 
passed on generationally.283 
This method of analysis reveals the private accumulation of 
sovereignty through these processes.  Not only would this be 
necessary for a case such as Mabo—directly within the context of 
conquest—but also for more mundane, seemingly local cases 
regarding land use, landlord-tenant law, or the like.  With regards 
to the latter, the values that informed which claim should win (and 
in some sense which claim was more legitimate) might be less taken-
for-granted if the power structures that shaped the applicable 
property regimes were recognized more explicitly. 
We see through this analysis that the border-crossing operations 
of  the notion of property and property regimes are not new, but 
 
 280  On the relationship between modernity and globalization, see ARJUN 
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rather, adopting a wider theoretical lens brings property law’s often 
violent creation, usurpation and consolidation into sharper relief.  
Appreciating property in global context and as a process of 
transnationalization of law lends its own insights into how ideas 
around transnational property have been present for centuries.  This 
implies that “transnational property,” though not called that, has 
influenced the development of common law (as well as other forms 
of law) in a constitutive way from inception. 
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